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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
While the writer was an undergraduate he spent two
Summers in the Panamint mountains above Death Valley,
fornia.
that

Cali-

Hiking with one of the few old-timers remaining in

region~

he noticed that "the old desert rat" would

stoop occasionally to pick up certain rocks which he would
examine closely.

Some went into a pouch he carried.

were later crushed and "panned."

They

If they made a "showing"

in the gold-pan, the prospector would retrace his steps and
arduously search for the parent vein.

In similar fashion

the writer has ventured upon interesting features in the
life and character of the man, Antiochus Epiphanes.

It is

the aim of this dissertation to seek all of the facts concerning his life, assay them and then seek to accurately
appraise them uninfluenced by the propaganda of the past.
I. THE PROBLEM
1. Statement of the problem.

The problem of this disserta-

tion is the critical study of all the sources of the life of
Antiochus Epiphanes, in an earnest effort to properly
evaluate them and thus arrive at an accurate appraisal of the
relations of Antiochus IV Epiphanes with the Jews of Palestine.

3

2. tustification 2f !n!

~roblem.

There are valid reasons

for a restudy of this phase of the history of Antiochus
Epiphanes.

Writers have been prone to refer to his policy

of Hellenization as forced upon his unwilling subjects when
even antagonistic sources plainly say that the privileges of
Hellenism were earnestly sought and consIdered a mark of the
king's special favor.

1

Again the tendency of historians up to the last decade
has been to overlook the vast importance of the history of
the Middle and Far East upon the policy of the Seleucids.
This bias is caused by an understandable lack of knowledge
on the part of western writers about these vast inland
reaches of this mysterious oriental Eapire.
The Character of Antiochus itself has been obscured

)

by the bitter hatred of his adversaries.

It is easy to com-

prehend the motives behind the disparagement of Antiochus by
his detractors.
enemy.

The Jews looked upon him as their great

They spoke of his desecration of their temple as

"the abomination of desolation."

One of their five great

festivals was in celebration of the rededication of the
temple after the forces of their persecutor no longer contaminated the sacred precincts.

The Hellenistic writers on

the other hand, apart from their descending to the level of
mere

gossi~mongers

their sympathies.
1.

II

at times, were definitely anti-Syrian in
Guided by these sources the historians

Macc. 4:9.

4

have termed Antiochus a fool, vain, silly and theatrical. 2
His title was misunderstood or consciously twisted and a pun
made by changing his name from Epiphanes, Illustrious (as
they interpreted it), to Epimanes, ¥adman. 3 While admitting
the ability of the man, modern writers follow the earlier
trend calling him, hysterical, half-mad;4 blustering, savage
and terror-stricken;5 superficial, BOhemian;6 vindictive.?'
Tarn however in this decade has drawn a brilliant picture of
him as a forceful, intelligent and far-seeing ruler who
might have done great things had his success not been precluded by his early death. 8 Swain, another writer of this
decade has said, nalthough hardly a statesman of the first
rank, he was an intelligent and able man. n9

2. Bactria, p. 183; Cf. pp. 35, 75.

3. Polyb. 26:1S:::Athen. 10:439a; Livy 41:20. The
proper translation of Epiphanes, as Antiochus title, should be
manifest god.
It is possible also to translate it in the less
exalted sense of lllustrious~ The latter senee is necessary to
the turn of the pun.
4. Walter otto, Zur Geschichte der Zeit des 6 Ptolemaers (Wissenschaften:-1934), p.=S4.
---- --5. G. A. Frank Knight,
pp. 450-5.

Kil~ ~

Jordan (London: 1921),

6. B.S. , 131.
7. Bouchi-Leclercq, Bistoire dee §eleucids (Paris, 1914),
p. 262.
8. Bactria, Chapter IV, pp. l29ff.

9. Swain, p. 79.

5

More particularly OttolO has recently made a careful
study of this period which has been fruitful especially in
dealing with the origins of the Sixth Syrian War.

Tarn has

brought out the importance of the eastern influence on the
policy of this ruler. ll Just recently Swain has rightly
pointed out the fact, hitherto given insufficient consideration, that there was a general upsurge of the oriental peoples
throughout the"East.
This dissertation will concern itself more specifically
with the problem of the relation of Antiochus to his
Palistinian-Jewish subjects and the Maccabean Struggle in
the light of a corrected view of Antiochus' general character and policy.
II. THE SOURCES
i~

1.

P~cient

Sources.

a. polybius.

Polybius is our best source for the general

history of this period.

His work (as we have it) is not

~

complete but the gragments extant are very helpful.
was an accurate and critical historian.
the ways of Rome.

Polybius

He wrote to justify

He admitted that he sought to persuade

the Achaean League to send a force to Egypt to oppose
Antiochus there, yet he fairly sought to give an unbiased

t
i

10. 'If-. Ott!?, QIt•. Cj. t~.
11. Bactrla,z Loc. Cit.

6

appraisal of the Syrian's character. 12

Polybius does not

have any information concerning the Jews or the Kaccabean
struggle.

Bis knowledge was delimited by the western part

of Syria in the East.

When Antiochus III or his son

Epiphanes went East they dropped out of sight.
b. Appian.

This Alexandrian historian who wrote about the

middle of the Second century A.D. divided his history upon
ethnographic lines.
ject discussed here.

.Bis Syrian Wars shed light on the subAppian is very brief but he crowded an

abundance of material into a small compass.

Be is quite

reliable and of large importance.
~

J

,

I'"
..

,

)

c. I Maccabees.

I Maccabees is our best source for the

struggle between the anti-hellenic Jews and their Syrian
overlords.

It is of course biased.

Perhaps the author was

an eye witness to the events described.
d. Daniel.

The eleventh chapter of Daniel is as excellent

a picture of the Seleucid relations with Egypt as we have when
the peculiarities of its style and purpose are understood.
The accuracy of the account of the war between Antiochus and
the Ptolomies ceases after the day at E1eusis and the
persecution of the Jews which followed.
not clear.

Verses 11:40 ff. are

Charles says that the rest of the chapter is

prophecy and was not completely and accurately fulfilled. 13

12. Polyb. 29:23ff; 28:18.

13. R. B. Charles, Commentary 2a Daniel (Oxford: 1929),

p. 318.

7

The brevity and obscurity of the apocalyptic style of the
book make it difficult to understand.
II Maccabees. Jason of Cyrene wrote a five volume work
-on the Kaccabean struggle. A later writer made a one book
~.

epitome of Jason which is known as II Maccabees.

The Second

Book of the Maccabees has recently experienced a great turn
of fortune.

From the lowest opprobrium it has been raised to

the heights by the championship of Heise in his Crit!£
beideq Makkabaet and his Geshichte der Griechischen
Makedonlsch

~ten.

~

ygg

nIt is an edifying disturbance of

accepted opinion. n14 Rostovtzoff says of the two Maccabees
and Josephus, "These sources are sufficiently based on good
evidence to give a picture which is substantially correct."15
£. Josephus, Antiquities Qf

the~.

Josephus, son of

Mattathias, a priest, was one of the leaders of the Jews in

f
\

:

their rebellion against Rome during the First Christian
Century.

Be was captured by Vespasian and became a favorite

of the man who was soon to be Emperor.

The

Antiquit~

was

written in Greek for a Roman audience in order to familiarize
the Romans with the essentials of Jewish history.
was not above touching up the narrative.

Josephus

Be shows confusion

in his ,history of the period before the outbreak of the

revolt against Antiochus.

His account of the revolt differs

from that of the two books of the Maccabees.

14. S.S., p. 168, n. 2.
15. Rostovtzoff,

~

VII, p. 192, n. 1.

8

g.
Rome.
.i

!

1
I

I

Titus Livius wrote 142 books on the history of

~.

Books

41-45 bear on the subject of this inquiry. Livy

was neither critical nor accurate.
in favor of Rome.

Be was manifestly biased

Be has served history most by preserving

otherwise unpreserved portions of Polybius.

n.

Diod~rus

Siculus.

The forty books of Diodorus covereda

'period of eleven hundred years.

Unfortunately only the first

five are extant in their entirety.

The other books, important

as they are, are available only in miserable fragments discovered here and there.

Books 29-34 cover the period under

investigation.

a.
it.

Strabo.

The Geography of Strabo has historical notes in

From these notes fragmentary information can be gleaned

for the whole period.
~..

wrote

Justin.

In Augustus' time Trogus Pompeius (Justinus),

44 books upon the subject of the history of Macedon and

the Diadochi.

The work was good but is only extant in an

epitome which Justinus drew up.

It is important for western

history, but when the East is discussed the epitomist mangled
th~

information miserably.

For the Eastern Campaign of Anti-

ochus it is important in that it is often the only source
available.
~.

Qassius Dio.

Antiochus.

Dio has a few crumbs of knowledge about

The information is most fragmentary and none of it

is not given in some other source.

I

~'

9

--a. fi. !. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization.

2. Modern writers.

This standard

work is helpful in understanding the dominant civilization
underlying the world history of the period under examination.
b. !. W. Tarn I

~

Qreeks in Bactria

~

India.

This book

has been the greatest contribution to the knowledge of the
subject of this study.

Tarn has been very daring in many of

his statements but subsequent investigation has vindicated
much of his pioneer work.

He paints Antiochus Epiphanes as

an able, brilliant and resourceful ruler.

While he quails

at the word "statesman", Tarn's characterization cemtainly
would indicate that classification for his hero.

Tarn is

one of the few who have taken the history of the middle and
Farther East into account in his evaluation of Seleucid
history.
c. HQstovtzeff,
Hellenistic World.

Soci~l

and Economic Historr of !he

This epoch-making contribution stands

alone in its unique contribution to the study of Hellenistic
History.

The vast store of knowledge necessary to the social

and economic approach to the history of the period has been
found in the brain of this Russian scholar.

He opens new

fields of information in the study of causation as he reveals and correlates these underlying causes behind the
events of history.
d. Bevan,

~

House

2!

Seleucus, Vol. 11,

This is a good

10

standard work in the field of Seleucid history.

It is care-

fully done and of pract.1cal help.
e. !.

~,

Zur Geschichte

~

Zeit des

2 ptolemaers.

speaks of this book as the best in the field.

Tarn

It is a careful

study of the subject from the Egyptian point of view.

I

Rostovtzeff follows Tarn in rejecting the view of this author
with regard to the results of Eleusis.
f. !. Kolbe, Beitrage !Yt §lrischen und
Geschichte.

Judische~

Kolbe has worked out the chronology for the period

carefully and from excellent sources.

His chronology is

accepted as standard.
g.

1.

Schurer,

AHistorz

Qi

~

Jewi§b People in

!n~ ~

2! Jesus £hrist. Here is a careful and exhaustive work much
of which, however, has now been outdated.
h. !. I_ EamseY, Ib& Qities of

~.

Paul.

The vast knowledge

of this student of Hellenism is of value to us in the study of
the Greek City in the Seleucid Empire in the part of his work
which takes up a historical study of the city of Tarsus.

,

i. Bouche-Leclercq, H1stoire des Seleucids.
best of the French works in the field.
thoroughly prepared.
of the subject.

This is the

It is carefully and

The author goes into all the problems

Pages 123-315 cover the Seleucids from

Antiochus III to Antiochus V.

3. Other Works.
a. Cambridge Ancient History.

This standard work is especially

helpful in the chapter by E. R. Bevan on Syria and the Jews in

-r
;

~

11

Volume VIII.

The Third volume of plates is helpful in a study

of the coins of Antiochus Epiphanes.
b.

I. I.

Newell, Boyal Greek Portrait Coins.

This volume

contains the coins by which the succession of Antiochus IV
to the throne of Syria is traced.

Because of the unavailability

of the British Museum Catalogue, this volume has been most
helpful.
c. i.. McKee Adams..
enism.

The Struggle 2l the

~

with Hell-

In his theSis Dr. Adams carefully and exhaustively

traces the conflict between the Jews and lUHlenism back to
its sources.

It is unfortunate that it has not been printed.

d. i.. !. Swain, "Antiochus Epiphanes and

~gypt.n

one of the outstanding studies on the subject.

This is

The author

carefully investigates Antiochus with regard to Egypt.

His

chief contribution is his emphasis upon the rise of the
forces of orientalism throughout the Eastern part of the
Hellenistic world.
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION.
Chapter Two will
I.

re

concerned with the historical

background of the immediately preceeding period of Seleucid
history.

The policy of Antiochus III the Great, bis eastern

campaign, his relations with Rome and the results of Magnesia
are necessary to a proper understanding of the events in
Epiphanes'day.

The reign of Seleucus IV, Antiochus Epiphanes'

brother, is included for the same reason.

-".-

\
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Chapter Three will lay the immediate background for
the productive period of Antiochus Epiphanes' life.

It will

trace the influences of his life as a hostage at Rome; his
period of Hellenic influence during his stay at Athens; the
method by which he succeeded to the throne, first as regent
for his nephew, and later as sole ruler.

It will be necess-

ary to include an analysis of Antiochus' character in order
to understand properly his life.

A brief survey of the

economic and social conditions of the Seleucid realm will
conclude the chapter and complete the necessary background
to a proper understanding of the reign of Epiphanes.
Chapters Four and Five will be concerned with the
reign of Antiochus.

The Fourth Chapter will quickly survey

the Policy of Antiochus, the Egyptian War and the affairs in
the East in the light of the latest information available
with occasional corrections by the author in the light of
the sources as he can best evaluate them.
The Fifth Chapter will confine itself to the Palestinian Jewish problem.

A very brief summary of the post-

exilic history of the Jews will be followed by an investigation of the Hellenizing policy of Antiochus.

The policy of

Hellenization of the Jews will then be discussed and the
results of the clash between the two forces set forth.
A Sixth and final Chapter will be devoted to a Summary
of the results of this investigation.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

,
I~
\

~(

.\
,

,

I'

:yo

I

CHAPTER II

!

\

HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

The year 221 B.C. saw three young rulers, Philip V,
Ptolemy IV Philopator and Antiochus III, upon the thrones of

I

the three hellenistic monarchies of Macedonia, Egypt and
Syria.

Philip was a popular ruler, "the darling of Hellas."

It looked as though he might unite the Greeks.

In 215 after

a naval brush with the Romans had forced him out of the
Adriatic he allied himself with Carthage, hoping for help
from their fleet.
against Philip.

The Romans invoked the aid of Aetolia
Having thus blocked the fleet of Philip,

while deeply involved with Carthag_e, Rome left the fighting
in Greece to the Aetolians.
Philip in 205.

Rome then made peace with

Aetolla being left to its own devices was

forced to make asgraceful an exit from the war as was possl
ible under the circumstances.
I.
1. His policy.
deteriorate.

ANTIOCHUS III, THE GREAT

Ptolemy III had allowed the Egyptian army to
Antiochus, the energetic and ambitious young

ruler of Syria saw this condition as his opportunity to restore
1. H. H. Scullard, A ~istorY 2l !h! Roman World 121-146

B.g. (London: 1935), p. 21 •

14

the empire of his ancestor Seleucus I.
been his life's ambition. 2
f

\

I

This seemed to have

He had neither attempted to make conquests in India
nor to take possession of defeated Egypt, but had
risked and finally suffered war with Rome for the
sake of a few cltie~ in Thrace because they had belonged to Seleucus.
.
But that is to get ahead of the story.

Antiochus determined

to take advantage of the weakness of Egypt and wrest Asia
Minor and Palestine from his young, indolent, inattentive
and art-loving contemporary.4 In this however Antiochus had
reckoned without the ability of Sosibius, the Egyptian general, who held the Syrian off with his Palestinian fortresses until a mercenary army of Greeks could be assembled.
Egyptians also opened a

~andora's

The

box of future troubles for

themselves in that they armed the natives and sent them into
the battle.

This turned the tide for Egypt but the expedient

cost the ptolemies endless trouble, for the natives learned
i.!

'\

that they could fight and beat a Greek army.

The native

revolts thereafter kept the country in constant strife. 5
a. The Battle
\
\

!1 Raphia. At Raphia just north of the

Egyptian border in 217 the armies met.

2. Bactria, p. 189.

-

3. Loc. cit.

\

4. Polby., 5:34; Cf. 14:11,12.

t

5. ReI Civ., p. 19.

i

Antiochus leading

-.,-

..

\,
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the cavalry charged against the Egyptian left wing commanded
by Philopator.

Be won this conflict but instead of turning

his force against the enemy center or the left wing, he led
the cavalry in a foolhardy pursuit of the fleeing Egyptians.
The Egyptian forces left on the field on their part were

,

successful and when Antiochus returned he found the bulk of
his army beaten.

Ptolemy did nothing to follow up this

decisive victory but rettred to Egypt and gave himself up to
drunken reveling.

Be did not even attempt to retake Seleucia ..
in Pieria which Antiochus had captured in 219. 6
b.

In! "Anabasis." The defeat at Raphia did not dishearten

young Antiochus.

Be justified himself by feeling that if the

whole army had foUlbt as well as he' had, the battle would have
been' won. 7 Be considered the reverse as temp.orary and set
,

!

.

about restoring his empire with youthful vigor.

His cousin,

Archaeus was in charge of affairs in Asia Minor.

Archaeus

:
I

gave evidence that he was playing the role of independent
king.

Antiochus attacked him energetically and finally one

of his friends, Bolis by name, betrayed, him into Antiochus'
hands. 8 After three years of fighting in alliance with
Pergamum, Asia Minor was pacified.
"Anabasis" in the East.
~,

t
r

*

)

6. Polby. 5:82ff.
7. B.

W.,

p. 49.

8. Polby. 8:15-34if,

Antiochus then began his

Bis strategy was not to reconquer

16

Parthia and Bactria, both of which had revolted, but to reestablish the Seleucid authority among the eastern Satraps.
This successful campaign was widely heralded as a duplication of the feat of Alexander and the title "Great King"
was bestowed upon him.

t

His prestige among his subjects and

outside his kingdom was greatly enhanced by his success in
this venture. 9
2. TreatI with Philip V.

Antiochus, the Great, still had

his heart set on the conquest of Egypt but did not dare to
move South with a possible hostile Philip behind him.

There-

fore after the death of Philopator he invited Philip to
share the foreign provinces of Ptolemy with him, and they
signed the treaty in the winter of 203-202 whi!ch so ,shocked
PolYbius. lO They hoped that Egypt torn by a revolt of the
ll
natives would not be able to offer much resistance.
a. Second

Ma£edoai~

!!t.

The brutal conduct of Philip

following this notorious treaty induced Rhodes and Pergamum
to call upon Rome for help thus bringing the disastrous
\

.\

Second Kacedonian War upon him.12

While Rome was busy with

Philip, Antiochus set about the conquest of the coast of
Asia Minor and the annexation of Palestine and Phoenicia.

t
J-~

t~

9. !l.!. , pp. 49-50.
10. Polyb. 15:20.
11. !!.!. , p. 51; Cf. Supra, p. 15.
12. Polyb. 15:20-24.
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Ptolemy's general Scopus wrested Judea away from Antiochus
in 199 but at Panium, near the headwaters of the Jordan,
Scopus was finally defeated the next year and 122 years of
Ptolemaic rule of the eastern approaches to Egypt was at
end. 13

This was an economic blow, for this territory because

of its control of the eastern trade routes had been a
necessary part of the economy of Egypt.
b. Roman Attitude toward Antiochus III.

Following their

victory over Philip at Cynoscephelae, the Romans sent L.
Cornelius Lentulus and three others to Antiochus for a
"determined assault on the king."
protectors of Ptolemy V.

They sought to pose as

Antiochus made the announcement

that he had already made peace with Egypt, that Egypt had
renounced all her Syrian, Asiatic and Thracian dependencies
and that his daughter, Cleopatra, was betrothed to Ptolemy.
Holleaux concludes, "he made the Romans look extremely

/

foolish."14

This piece of statesmanship removed the Roman

pretext for interference and the new territory remained in
the hands of Antiochus.

\
\

\

~

.

Rome was wearied by her wars with Carthage and Macedonia and had her hands full in Spain.

The party of Cato

was opposed to extending her responsibilities in the East

"<l

13. Ibid., 16:39.
14. CAB VIII, pp. 186,7; Polyb. 18:49-52.

--"I;"
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because of the debilitating influence of the East upon the
Romans which be considered corrupting. 15 There was no
immediate clamor in Rome for war with AntiochuS. 16 Deep
in the heart of Rome however was a fear of the Eastern pow-

ers with their great military tradition.

Alexander had

probably entertained ambitions in the West.

His successors

had been ambitious men and Phyrrus had even fought and
defeated Rome on Italian soil.

The defeat of Philip left

the power of Antiochus as the threat which Rome feared.
Rostovtzeff concludes,
We are therefore not surprised to find that the
Romans after the Second Kacedonian war gradually
but systematically made war with Antiochus inevitable, though Antiochus tried by every means
to avoid it (193 B.C.). They wanted to weaken
the great Oriental conqueror while they were on
more or less good terms with Greece and before
Philip was willing and prepared to cooperate
with him.17
Although Rome did not at first seem to desire war
and Antiochus did all in his power to forestall it,
Eumenes II of Pergamum and the Aetolians did want war.
EWLeues sought to regain bis power in Asia Minor while the

Aetolians sought revenge upon Rome for what they considered
her betrayal at the close of the Second Macedonian War. 18

\

,

15. H. H. Scullard,

~.

Cit., p. 278.

16. Hel. eiv., pp. 23,4.
17. Ii·!·, p. 55.
18. Polyb. 18:34; !4!z 35:13.
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a. In Bellas.

3. War with Rome.
Rome sent Antiochus an ultimatum regarding

the Thracian cities in 193.

Although he had not made

sufficient preparation for war Antiochus in March of the
next year accepted the Aetolean invitation to "liberate
Greece. n19 Be sought to unite all the Greeks in a struggle
against Rome.

Be landed 10,000 men at Demetrias (a large

enough army to start a war but insufficient to fight one) and
waited in expectation that all the Greeks would join him.
The Aetolians

fough~

bravely, but Philip could not forget his

grudge against the Aetolians, and the Achaean League along
with Philip supported Rome.

Ere long his unsupported force

was caught by his enemies and cut to pieces at the old death
trap, Thermopolae. 20
b.

In~.

The Romans saw that it would be unsafe for

them to ignore Antiochus this juncture.

They gathered a

large army in 189 under the leadership of L. Cornelius
Scipio, who was .accompanied by his brother Africanus, the
conqueror of Carthage, and sent it into Asia.

An~iochus

superstitiously thought his fortune had forsaken him.

He

failed to make a stand at the Hellespont and soon thereafter
his army was destroyed at Magnesia.

19. Po1yb. 20:8; Livy 36:19:11.
20. 12£.. Qll.

20
f

c. bIDall 2t

~

!m:. The treaty of Apamea which followed

in 188 was disastrous for Antiochus.

.,'.I,!

The Romans demanded

that: 21
1. Antiochus retire from Europe and all of Asia Minor
West of the Taurus.
2. An indemnity of 15,000 Euboian talents was to be
paid to Rome, 500 at once, 2500 upon the ratification of the

I

peace by the people of Rome, and twelve yearly payments of
1000 talents each.

3. Antiochus give up his fleet and his war elephants
promising to limit his navy to ten ships and to cease the
use of elephants in the army.

4. Antiochus surrender Hannibal and certain other
political refugees.
5. Antiochus pay Eumenes the 400 talents he owed him
and likewise furnish some grain promised Eumenes tby Antiochus,
the Great.
6. Twenty hostages be given to guarantee the

fulfillme~

of the treaty by Antiochus.
\

\

\

Rome thus became the dominant force in Asia.
allowed the Syrian kingdom to recuperate.
confusion and quarrels

with~n

Sbe never

Assassinations,

the kingdom and the royal

21. Polyb. 21:17; Livy 37:35:3. The formal treaty
is found in PDlyb. 21:42 and Livy 38:38.

21

I

\

house ensued and Rome always supported the elements of

,
{.

1

,,

disruption. 22
Henceforth the Hellenistic World ceased to be a
political unit.

Rostovtzeff says,

I have already insisted upon this unity and expressed
my conviction that unless the Hellenistic world is
treated as a single whole, its political development
in the third century B.C. can hardly be fully understood. The Roman intervention put an end to this
unity. No doubt there were still dipaomatic relations between the various kingdoms and cities,
dynastic marriages were still used as political
weapons and were very popular among the Greeks • • •
but all this was now of very little importance. Rome
through her agents, expecially the Pergamene kings,
kept a watchful eye on these relations and would not
tolerate even the possibility of a real rapprochement
between the important Hellenistic powers.
In fact the Hellenistic world was now split into
three groups, which were in no direct contact with
each other: Macedonia and Greece formed one group,
Asia Minor another, Syria and Egypt the third. 23
. Syria remained independent but with her fleet gone
and the most hellenized part of .her empire lost, she was
doomed to become by degrees an Oriental state.
only lived a year after Apamea.

Antiochus

He was killed in 187 while

attacking a temple state in Elymais. 24

He had been so weak-

ened that he was unable to entertain any hope of revenge.

22. Bevan, CAB VIII, 495·
23.

~.

World, pp. 55,6.

24. Strabo·16:l:18.
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.11. SELEUCUS IV

Antiochus the Great married Laodice, the daughter of
Mithradates. 25 They had six children that are known to us.
All of them became important figures in history.

The eldest

son, Antiochus,was associated with his father in the government from 208 until his death.

This younger Antiochus was

married to his sister, Laodice.

Bis untimely death in 192

made Seleucus the next in line for the succession at the age
of 30 years.

Other daughters were Cleopatra I, "the Syrian,"

who married Ptolemy V, and Antiochis who was later the queen
of Cappadocia.

The other son was a second Antiochus who was

later to follow his brother in the succession as Antiochus
IV.26

Seleucus married his sister Laodice, who had previous-

ly been the elder brother's wife.

Be had two Sons by her,

Demetrius, who later succeeded him, and Antiochus with whom
his uncle Antiochus was later to be associated as regent.
1. ais Policy.

Scant mention is given Seleucus IV in the

sources.

Be did not come to the throne as an untried novice •
.,
Bouche-Leclercq says that
La vi~royaut' de Thrace avait fait preuve de
capacites diplomatiques et militatres au cours de
la malheureuse guerre engagee par son p~re contre
les Romains.

25. Polyb. 5:43.
26. Grace Helen Macurdy, Hellenistic Queens (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932), pp. 91,2.

-r
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II avait • • • comm~de/ un corps dtarmee a la
bataille de Mag~sie.27
For six years after the death of his elder brother, Antiochus, Seleucus was the heir-apparent to the throne.
king his course naturally was not a brilliant one.

As
The

debacle at Magnesia had effectively doomed any aggressive
plans for the kingdom.

The only sound policy possible was

to abstain from expensive adventures and thus be able to
meet the expense of the crushing indemnity.

Bevan says that

Seleucus dealt prudently with the situation. 28

A contempor-

ary opinion of him says, "He caused an exactor to pass
through the land,"29

.J

indicating the financial strait the

kingdom was in and the heavy taxes necessary for the payment

'

of the Roman indemnity.

The exactor was doubtless the chief

minister, Heliodorus, whom II Maccabees connects with an
attempt to rob the temple at Jerusalem. 30
Outside of his dominions Seleucus followed the policy
of peace at any price.

Bouche-Leclercq
calls attention to a
""

fragment of Diodorus which says that Seleucus prepared to
cross the Taurus in aid of Pharnace in his war with Eumenes
II of Pergamum but upon consideration of his realm's relation
27. Bouch'-Leclercq, Histoite de Seleucides (paris:
1914), p. 227.
28. CAB VIII 494f.
29. paniel 11:20.
30. II lacc; Cf. below pp. 49, 50.

•
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to Rome nil renounce a son entreprise. n31

Seleucus probably

began the policy which his brother so ably augmented--the
strengthening of the Greek element within the empire. 32
He was on friendly terms with the Achaean League and furthur
kept his interest in Greek affairs by giving his daughter to
Perseus of Macedon in 177. 33

This was a great event.

The

Rhodian navy sent a guard of honor to escort the princess to
her new home.

Rome of course was suspicious and nfirent

retomber leur mauvaise humeur sur les Rhodiens. n34

Reuter

maintains that Seleucus sought to create a Panhellenistic
alliance against Rome, but one is inclined to agree when
,.,

'

Rostovtzeff says the evidence is too scanty to support this
view. 35
2. Attitude 2f EgYpt.

Egypt again began to take an aggressive

attitude toward Syria after the disaster at Magnesia.

The

Egyptians had offered their support to Rome in the campaign
,',

against Antiochus III.

Eumenes II of Pergamum had been given

most of Asia after the war but Egypt had received nothing-not
even Coele-Syria.

Polycrates the military leader of Egypt

~

31. Bouche-Leclercq, Q:Q.. QU., p. 231.
32. Bactria, p. 186.
33. Polyb. 25: 4:8-10.
/
34. Bouche-Leclercq, QE.. Qil.., p. 235.

35.

~.!.,

pp. 1492,3 n. 125.

~r
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decided that the time to regain this province had come.

The

sudden death of Ptolemy V however precluded this effort.
Cleopatra, his wife, became regent for the boy' Philometer.
Although she had transfered her loyalties to Egypt she did
not pursue the war with Syria which had been contemplated. 36
Seleucus IV's career was cut short while he was yet
in his early forties.

The chief minister, Heliodorus,

murdered the king in order that he might rule in his stead. 37
No details of this event are known.
C'est pour" avoir ainsi compris son tale et s'y ~e
tenu que Seleucos IV reste une figure un peu effac~e
entre son p~e, "le Grand" it son fr~" . "l'Illustre"
• • • ~ tout cas, il ne laissait pas dechoir la
dignit~ royal; il amintent le culte de~~es anc1tres
et le sien, do~dfun flamine sp'cial.~8

:

'

36. Bevan, Egypt, pp. 273, 282.
37. App. Syr. 45.
,;

38. Bouche-Leclercq,

~.

Qi1., p. 228.
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CHAPTER III
THE RISE TO POWER OF ANTIOCHUS IV
Antiochus III married a princess-Laodice, the daughter
of Mithradates, king of Pontus, who himself had married a
)1

Laodice, the sister of Seleucus II.
ochus III was his first cousin.
children.

Thus the wife of Anti-

The royal couple had six

The age of all the children is not known but Epi-

phanes was the third son, the second with the name Antiochus.
One wonders how they managed to identify the different boys
and one's wonder is increased by the knowledge that one of
the girls was named Antiochis. l

I.

EARLY LIFE

As a lad Antiochus could entertain little hope of
ever reigning as successor to his father.

His elder brother,

Antiochus, was associated with his father as early as 208
according to the Babylonian records.

2

Upon his brother's

demise the next eldest brother, Seleucus became the heirapparent, and Antiochus' position remained essentially unchanged.

1. Supra, 23.

2. Clay, Babllonian Eecords in .:the illr.ary Qf ~ir
pont Morgan, II, p. 13, Morgan Library Collection, 2171,
cited by Grace H. Macurdy, Hellenistic Queens (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932), p. 91.
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The young man was sent to Rome following the
Roman victory at Magnesia as one of the twenty hostages. 3
As to the length of his stay in Rome, most authorities say
that he was there thirteen or fourteen years.

Tarn's

conjecture4 would imply that Antiochus remained in Rome from
the time of his father's defeat at Magnesia until the death
of Seleucus.
visit.

Be takes up the whole period with the Roman

Consideration must be made of the time necessary to

travel from Rome to Athens and from Athens to Syria by way
of Pergamum.

Be resided at Athens long enough to attain the

office of general and was in office long enough for coins
to be struck which bear his name. 5 No doubt it took time
also for Antiochus to complete his negotiations with the
Pergamene kings and prepare the Asian army for the invasion
of Syria.

One is led to conclude that about two years before

Seleucus was killed, Demetrius was sent to replace his uncle
at Rome; Antiochus, realizing that a younger brother was a
poor insurance risk in the court of an oriental despot,
settled down in the "healthy" climate of Athens and there
occupied his energies as one of the chief magistrates of
Athens until he was interrupted by. the news of this brother's
death.
3. App. §yr., 39; Buprth pp. 21,2.

4. Bel. Civ., p. 30.
years in Rome.
I. Cf. p. 31 n. 12.

Tarn says he spent fourteen

I
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AS a hostage at Rome the young prince was separated

\

from the usual cortege of eunuchs and flattering courtiers
which would have dominated his environment had he lived in
the east.

The ordered freedom and the political morality of

the Republic were the admiration of the Greek
day.6

I
,f

wo~ld

of that

In Rome he circulated in a republican atmosphere

where he was treated as an equal.

Be was well received by

the young Roman aristocracy and became intimate with many.7
The unceremonious freedom and the undignified familiarity of
Rome left its stamp upon him.

On the less desirable side,

nil avait vecu au milieu d'une

soci~te

prematurement cor-

rumpue, ou l'hypocrisie remplacait la vertu, en attendant
que Ie vice put sty etaler librement."8

One can imagine

that a young man of his energy and intellect would seek to
discover the sources of strength in the. Colossus to the west
which had toppled his father's kingdom as easily as Alexander had conquered the same territory.

The Roman influence

was strongest during the first five years of his reign.

6. Bouse

S~l~

Be

p. 128.

7. Livy 42:6; Justin 34:3:2.

I

8. Bouch~Leclercq, Bistoire des Seleucids (paris:
1913), p. 245. Swain (pp. 90 ff.), draws an unlovely picture
of the political scene in Rome about this time. Be outlines
in detail the rise of a new aristocratic clique and speaks ~
their "gangster-like activities" after they rose to power.

I
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I
loved to toy with the political institutions of the Republic
and even played at running for office and acting in the
capacity of an elected officia1. 9 This was na passing phase
which culminated in the building of a temple at Antioch to
Jupiter capitolinus. nlO One wonders whether in all this
Antiochus was not playing a part, hoping to convince the
Senate that he would be subservient to them.
2. A1 Athens.
from Rome.

Antiochus stopped at Athens "on his way home"

His standing, liberality and pleasing personality

won for him the good will of the citizens there.

His popu-

larity was so great that he was elected to be General of the
Hoplites.

Bevan cites an inscription which "is believed to

be a copy of a decree passed by the Athenian people thanking
Eumenes for having set their late general upon the throne of
his fathers. nIl

There are extant coins issued by Athens with

the Athenian Owl and Antiochus' name associated with the
name of two other officials.

The characteristic Seleucid
symbol, the elephant, assures the identification. 12 This

9. Polyb. 26:1.
10. Bactria, p. 186; Livy 40:20.
11. CAR VIII, p. 497; OGIK, 248
12. BMC, Attica p. 36, No. 328, Pl. xi. 1. Silver
Attic tetradrachm, 16·7 grammes. Cf. Bill, Historical Greek
Coins (London:1906), pp. 140-43, in support of the elephant
badge as characteristicly Seleucid. Prof. L. L. Howe, QJ- Q~Qf
L. Bist. Dept. told the writer in conversationnOn,::some of the
specimens the features of the goddess Athens on the ob~erse
(to me at least), -very strongly resemble Antiochus."

I
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coin established Antiochus t Athenian citizenship and his
position as an official.
3. Seizure 2f

~

throne.

During Antiochus t residence in

Athens, Seleucus was assassinated by Heliodorus, one of the
court officers. Hl3 Eumenes II of Pergamus aided Antiochus
in gaining the throne by setting him at the head of the Pergamene army.14
melted away_

Seeing his substantial backing the opposition

The well known loyalty of the Greeks for the

royal house made it easy no doubt for Antiochus to overcome
even Heliodorus, who as an established public administrator
had doubtless entrenched his administration of national
affairs well in view of the coming coup.d'etat. 15
Antiochus Epiphanes at first ruled as regent for his

13. App. Syr., 45.
14. Appian, Loc. cit., says that Eumenes, now suspicious
of Rome saw this as his opportunity to gain the friendship of
Syria. Rome would be expected to favor Antiochus, the Romanized
Prince, to either of Selucus t sons or a Syrian usurper who
was an unknown quantity, says Bouch€-Leclercq, 2£. Cit. Swain
pp. 78,9 says, Hmodern writers gravely misrepresent his
(Eumenes~, character and importance when they dtpict him as a
mere "lackey" of Rome. H He had recognized Romets military
might and was scheming to use it for his own purposes--the
promotion of Greek culture and life. Another reason for
supporting Antiochus was that Eumenes II could not allow a
regicide in an adjoining kingdom to go unpunished or· rule in
unmolested peace.
~ 15. OGIS, 247.
Heliodorus was a citizen of Antioch and
a (J"UVT,IUlq,oS
of the king, Q.n!. having been brought Bl? with
the ..;-oyal ~hildren. One might surmise that he possibly
planned to bulwark his authority by marrying Laod1ce (Cf. p.
23), and then declaring himself regent for her younger son
by Seleucus IV, Ant1ochus.
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infant nephew, Antiochus, as regent.

The hypothesis that he

married his sister Laodice to secure possession of her child
16
is now generally accepted.
Coins were later issued with
no change save the substitution of the portrait of Epiphanes
for that of the boy Antiochus. 17 The numismatic evidence is
confirmed by Cuneiform documents for the years 175-169 which
bear the dating nAntiochus and Antiochus Kings. n18

This

change in conception would make the child Antiochus IV, and
Epiphanes would become Antiochus V.

The time honored order

has not been replaced however because of the disruption and
misunderstanding such a course would produce.
At the time of the accession of Antiocbus Epiphanes,
his nephew Demetrius, the legal heir to the throne was in
Rome as a hostage for his father.

Be was forced to remain
there as hostage for his usurping uncle. 19 A contemporary

account described Epiphanes as nA contemptible person, on
whom the royal dignity has not been conferred, but who shall
come by stealth and shall win the kingdom by intrigues. n20

16. Thus she was married to all three of her brothers
in succession--Antiochus, Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV
Epiphanes.
/'

17. CAB Plates Vol. III, pp. 12, 13; Bouche-Leclercq,
Qj!. Cit., P:-24t>.
18. QA§ VIII, p. 498.
19. Polyb. 31: 2,11; Zonaris 9:25; .App. Syr., 45.
20. Daniel 11:21.

,
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As Demetrius was but a child, perhaps eleven or twelve
years of age, it was fortunate for the realm that a strong
hand was on the helm.

4. Epiphanes sole ruler.

In the year 170 Antiochus was in

Cilicia subduing an uprising.

I
I

kingdom in his absence.
Antiochus destroyed.

Andronicus was managing the

For some reason he had the young

At 'the same time Andronicus killed

Onias III, the exiled ex-high-priest of the Jews. 21

Coins

thereafter born the image of Antiochus as king indicating
that he assumed complete authority over the kingdom at that
time.
II. PERSONALITY OF ANTIOCHUS
The reputation of Antiochus Epiphanes preceeds him
wherever his name is mentioned.

His name is the symbol for

pitiless persecution and oriental despotism at its worst.

In a large measure this prejudice can be attributed to the

21. Diod. Sic. 30:7:2. Andronicus was put to death
by Epiphanes when he returned (Cf. II Macc 4:37,8).
Although the older sources are unfriendly to Antiochus
Epiphanes, none of them say that the king had the boy put
out of the way. Bevan thinks that Andronicus would hardly
have killed the boy if he had not believed Antiochus would
have been glad (CAB VIII, 504). The murder of the boy
however would have had little motive on Antiochus f part
because Demetrius, the legitimate heir was yet alive and
in Rome. The early coins and inscriptions do prove that
the child lived for some years and was not destroyed as
Soon as his uncle arrived in Syria.

r
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early historians.

The Jews considered him as the enemy of

their natioa.and its faith.
friendly.

The Romans likewise were un-

The result is that the uncritical reader finds

only an unsympathetic picture of the man revealed.

If all

the evil things said about Antiochus were true, he would
'lI<,

indeed hardly be worthy of the bottom-most reaches of perdition.

Daniel speaks of him as "A contemptible person. • •

who shall come by stealth and shall win the country by intrigues • • • he shall practice treachery.,,22!he chief
characterization of I Maccabees is summed up in the word
arrogance.

Jason of Cyrene childishly complained, accusing

Antiochus of "thinking in his arrogance that he would make
the land navigable and the sea traversable on foot, he was so
intoxicated in mind. n2 3

Polybius tried to overcome a strong

personal bias against the enemy of Egypt and the usurper of
his friend Demetrius' kingdom, but he 'said that Antiochus'
virtue broke down in the face of temptation and that he
attacked Egypt in the face of all his promises. 24
some thought he was "undoubtedly mad".25
the Jew has never forgiven Antiochus.

Ling said

Down through history

Bevan has continued

the charge that he was a superficial nBohemian" who allowed

22. Daniel 11:21-3.
23. ll~· 5:21.
24. Polby. 28:18.
25.

~

21:20.

,
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the external glories of hellenism to possess his mind. 26
Otto has painted a brilliant picture of a half-mad
hysterical king who was the grave-digger of his empire. 27
It is surprising to discover in contrast to such evil
reports that even antagonistic sources have been forced to
speak praise of the Syrian.

Livy concedE that Antiochus

had a truly kingly spirit with regard to his munificence to
cities and his care for divine worship.

He says that Antio-

chus! magnificent public spectacles surpassed those of all
other klngs.28
further

Polybius also mentions these qualities and

congratula~

him, describing his conduct of the

Egyptian was as nenergetic, daring in deSign, and worthy of
the royal dignity.n 29 Appian, who is the most objective
source, called him spirited and illustrious and averred
that he governed with a firm hand. 30 The greatest compliment
paid the king's capacity is the statement of Appian that the
Roman Senate rejoiced at his death, and then, and only then,
dared to enforce the terms of the treaty of ApameB by
destroying the. military power of Syria which Antiochus had
rebuilt so well. 3l
26. House Sel., 131.
27. otto. QQ. Cit., p. 84.
28. Livy 41:20.
29. Po1yb. 28:18.
30. App. Syr., 45:6.

--

31. Loc. Cit.
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To the writers of all ages the king has been an enigma.
Even when they make statements in praise of him they inevitably end on a harsh note.

There seemed to be so many contra-

dictory elements in his nature.

Be was an oriental monarch;

yet he played at being elected to republican office and then
acted the part of a Roman judge in the market place. 32 He
played pranks on his highest courtiers and was effusive in
his hospitality to utter strangers. 33 Be wandered through
the city of Antioch with but one or two companions and was
often found in the shops of the 'goldsmiths and silversmiths,
its world famed artizans. 34

He invited the world to his

celebration at Daphne which outshone the Roman triumph of
Amelius Paulus and then played the fool throughout. 35

What

did he mean?
Modern psychologists would pronounc him an insecure
personality.

His insecurity had been fostered from childhood.

Intensely ambitious he was born the third son of an oriental
monarch with all expectation of future power precluded by
his two older brothers.

Pampered in his youth, son of a

32. Polyb. 26:1; Athen. 5:193f.; Livy 41:20.
33. Ibid.
34.

~.

35. Ibid., 30:26.

36

father who had won great renown as a conqueror, his early
manhood was spent as a hostage for a father who had been
ignominiously defeated.
him.

He was not even a citizen, whereas he had been the son

of a king.

I,

I

At Rome everything was foreign to

Finally when he came to his kingdom it was with

the help of an hereditary enemy, and at first he was only
regent for his infant nephew. 36 Physicially he was menaced
by the malady which was to later shorten his career so disastrously.37

Above all the king of the richest country in the

world was forced into an obsequious abasement before Rome
which culminated in the stinging insult of Eleusis.

It is

little wonder that the king had difficulty in adjusting himself.

What so many have overlooked is that he overcame hiS

problems and became a strong ruler--one of the strongest in
a strong family.
A final summary of his character as king would follow
this order.

There was no doubt that he had a good mind in

spite of his mad pranks.

The burning ambition of the house

of Seleucus dominated his career.

These characteristics were

augmented by the personal charm and imagination which made

36. Supra., pp. 33,4.
37. Bactria p. 215, n.; App. Syr., 66 says he died of
consumption; a disease which does not kill quickly, Cf.
l!~. 9:1:12ff; Polyb, 31:9.

,
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him a perfect diplomat although his ethics were not of the
highest order (a factor which would enhance his usefulness
as a diplomat in any period of history).

His training in

Rome stimulated his gregarious tendencies and he never was
able to accept the restraints of court etiquette.
people and sought their company_

Be liked

He manifested a personal

irtterest in the work of the world-famed artizans of his
capitol city, he talked with lowly strangers, he bathed in
the public baths and enjoyed his practical jokes upon his
fellows there. 38 It is almost pathetic to picture him as he
came uninvited to banquets or entertainments seeking enjoyment and company only to have the guests become so abashed
in his presence that they shyly departed leaving the king
alone. 39

One must not overlook his vigorous energy nor his

perfect mastery of himself as he met his enemies so suavely
in diplomatic encounters that he made the Romans think that

,t

he enjoyed their

c~ude

oppression.

in punishing the rebellious.

He was a savage oriental

Be undoubtedly blundered in

pressing his campaign in Egypt as he also blundered in his
relations with the Jews.

Antiochus personally had little

to do with the Jewish problem.

Be sought to punish the

recalcitrant and the rebellious but the undoubted savagery

38. Polyb., 26:1:12-14.= Athen. 10:439a; Cf.
39. Ibid., 30:26:8.

Li~

41:20.

,

38

I

1,

I
IJ
\:

;1

of the religious persecution of the Jews was perhaps the
work of subordinates who were influenced by the desire on
the part of the Greeks and hellenizing Jews of the city of
Antioch (Jerusale~, to stamp out the unhellenized Jews. 40
All in all however he appears before us as a strong vigorous

\

ruler who Tarn says could have changed the history of the

.

world had he not died so soon.41

I
\

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

)

1. Territory.

The loss of Asia Minor west of the Taurus by

Antiochus III was a blow to the kingdom.

Much of the loss

however was compensated for the addition of Southern Syria
and Palestine to the kingdom of Egypt's expense.

The king-

dom as it came to Epiphanes was shorn of one third of its
territory.

Antiochus III had gained the title ngreat king"

for his successful expedition in the east, but MagneSia
had dissipated his control there.

The ancient Satrapy of

Parthia not only recovered her independence but was now
reaching out to the Caspian Gates.

Demetrius of Bactria had

annexed the Seleucid provinces east of the Persian desert. 42
What had been the ancient kingdoms of Assyria and Babylon

4fT.

41.

Bactri~

p. 215.

42. Bactria pp. 189,90.

39

was now more than ever the core of the empire and furthermore this section was not vulnerable to the Romans.

,

,
~

.,
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~

Syria,

Phoenicia and Palestine became the western borders of the
empire.
2. frosperitI.

Syria was not ruined by the losses at Apamea.

Its prosperity was not even seriously undermined.

The wealth

of Southern Syria probably surpassed that of Asia Minor. 43
The indemnity following Antiochus the Great's defeat, of
course, made for a difficult financial situation, no matter
how temporary.

One result was the rigid curtailment of the

ambitious political and military enterprises in which Antiochus the Great had been so completely immersed.
The Seleucids even at this time could probably be said
to be the wealthiest kings in the world. 44 Justification for
this statement is seen in the following financial achievements.
1. Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV were able to pay the
enormous tribute to Rome of 15,000 talents in thirteen years.
2. Antiochus made large and munificent gifts to many

cities in the Greek world. 45

,

J. Syria maintained a large and well equipped army and
Epiphanes was able to conduct an expensive war in Egypt.

43.

a.w.,

pp. 695.

44. ~.!., 703. "The Seleucids wbo succeeded Antiochus
III • • • were still enormously wealthy, probably more so than
their Egyptian rivals.
45. Cf. Strabo 9:1:17.

40
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4. The enormous wealth displayed in the festival at
Daphne manifested the wealth of Syria. 46
J. Economic resources.

The land and especially in Southern

Syria and Palestine produced a great variety of commodities
of good quality.

Agriculture was in a flourishing condition

with enough production to supply the domestic needs and also
provide a surplus for export.

Posidonius says, "and all the

people of Syria because of the great plenty which their land
afforded. were relieved of any distress regarding the necessaries of life" and therefore lived as in a continuous feast. 47
The industries of the kingdom are well known.

The

textiles of Babylon, the dye stuffs of Phoenicia, the glassware of Tyre and Sidon were famous.

The unguents, scented

oils and perfumes of the world were largely produced in this
territory.

The prodigality of the kings of Syria in their

expenditure of precious ointment is well known. 48

Pottery

from the country was exported throughout the world of that
day.

Especially were the Syrians famed for their work in

adorning their glassware with precious metals and gems.
Syria stood very high in the realm of the toreutic arts.

46. Polyb 30:25ff.
47. Quoted by M. Rostovtzeff, H. !., p. 697.
48. Polyb. ~. Q!1.
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4. International trad!. The wealth of Syria made her prominent in the world of trade.

Political and commercial rela-

tions were especially close between Rhodes and Syria.

An

illustration of this is the naval escort furnished by the
Rhodians to conduct the daughter of Seleucus IV Philopator
on her way to Macedonia to become the bride of Perseus.
There were many Syrians at Rhodes.

I

That city in conjunction

with Ephesus and Miletus, became the clearing house for Syrian
goods and trade.

The great overland caravan routes connect-

ing the Greece-Italian world with Arabia, India and China
all passed through the Seleucid realm enrighing it thereby.
The Euphrates route, the West Arabian route, the Chinese
"silk route" and the land routes of the Indian trade all
traversed Selucid territory.
Some violent methods of public finance were resorted
to in this period of financial difficulty.
'I
!

j

be treated in a subsequent chapter. 49

This subject will

Suffice it to say here

that the wealth of the many temples within the realm was
tremendous.

These hardy realists of course could be counted

upon to. draw from these resources when emergencies such as
the Roman indemnity arose •

./

49. Bouche-Leclercq. Q2. Cit. p. 240.
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5. Resulting policX.

Itis not surprising in the light

of the financial strength of the empire to note that Syria
never surrendered her political aspirations or hopes for
recovery and consolidation of the empire after the debacle
at Magnesia.
i

j

1

Seleucus IV was nl'ennemi sournois et
irreconciliable de Rome n50 Antiochus Epiphanes was anxious

to enlarge and consolidate his empire and made vigorous
efforts in that direction.

I

l

r
J

:j

'.jl
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50. Cf. p.
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CHAPTER IV
THE REIGN OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES -EGYPT AND THE EAST

CHAPTER IV
THE REIGN OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES
EGYPT AND THE EAST
The policy of Epiphanes for the first five years was
the same as that inaugurated by his father after Magnesia,
and which his brother Seleucus had steadfastly adhered to.
This policy was one of adherence to the treaty of Apamea,
avoidance of friction with Rome, strenuous efforts to pay

\

the huge Roman indemnity and peace at any price.

They also

;

strengthened the Greek element in the empire by founding
cities which were centers of Greek culture.
The year 169 saw a great change in the policy of Epiphanes.

There were several contributory factors to this

change.

The Third Macedonian War had begun two years before

and Perseus was somewhat sutcessful during the first phases

1,
.;

of that conflict.

War with Egypt seemed to be forced upon

Syria by the machinations of the two advisors of young
Ptolemy VI Philometor, Eulaeus and Lenaeus.

The sudden

death of the boy Antiochus, while Epiphanes was in Cilicia
suddenly placed the uncle in complete authority.

t

I,

Perhaps

the most important single factor in the change of policy on
the part of Epiphanes may have been that he had been veiling
his intentions up to this time and now felt that he was able

I
to seek openly the fulfillment of his ambitions.
indemnity was paid.

The Roman

A new generation of soldiers was now

ready to fill the ranks of the army.
nation had recuperated materially.

The finances of the
The king was ready,

Symptoms of disintegratian were calling for the king's
vigorous attention.
The most important was the steady orientalization of
the Empire. It found its expression in many and
various phenomena.
One was the gradual transformation of the Greek
mentality of the Greek settlers in the Seleucid Empire. They became in spirit, religion, and life more
Oriental. Another was the rise of national spirit
among the Oriental subjects of thelSeleucids--the
Arabs, the Jews, and the Iranians.
otto says,

1
-/

!
~

So richtig an sich sein Gedanke gewesen war, gegenuber dem vordringenden Orient wieder energisch die
Hellenischierungspolitik der ersten Seleukiden aufzunehmen, das hellenische Element in seinem Reich
auf jede Weise zu starken, und durch den Hellenismus
das auseinanderfallende Reich wieder fester zusammenaufassen, so abwegig war der Gedanke suf dem Wege des
Dekretierens eine volle Uniformierung der volkisch so
verschiedenartigen Elemente des Reiches gerade in
einer Zeit der Wiedererweckung des bodenstandigen
Elements herzustellen. 2
Rome was determined to undermine the strength of the kingdom
at every turn.

In the East and the South the former depend-

encies were increasingly powerful--Parthia, Bactria, Armenia

1. H.W., p. 63.
2. W. Otto, Zur Geschicte
(Wissenschaften: 1934), p. S5.

~

Zeit des

~

ptolemaers.
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and the Nabataean kingdom.
I. ANTIOCHUS' POLICY
Rostovtzeff contends that there is not sufficient
evidence to sustain the theory that Seleucus IV Philopator

I.

attempted to create a Panhellenistic alliance against Rome. 3
Likewise there is no indication that Epiphanes sought to
Romanize his kingdom and "establish a modus vivendi between
his Asiatic kingdom and Rome."

Tarn has made a strong case

for the preeminence of the East in the plans of Antiochus in

j

opposition to otto, who holds that Antiochus t chief ambition
was the conquest of Egypt.

Tarn's view has been accepted by

the later writers, Rostovtzeff and Swain.
sought to maintain the

stat~~

Antiochus thus

guo in the West in order to

avoid a second front in the West while he attempted to
subdue Armenia and Parthia. 4 Tarn proves his point to the
satisfaction of the present writer.

This view revolutionizes

the traditional view of Antiochus t foreign policy and also
puts a different aspect upon the Jewish revolt.
1. Qgification of the Kingdom.

I Maccabees records Antio-

chus attempt to unify his kingdom.

3.

~.!.,

p. 1492,3, n. 125.

4. Bactria, 183ff,; Otto, QR. Cit., p. 86f; Swain, p. 79.

Then the king wrote to ,his whole kingdom that they
should all become one people, and everyone should
give up his particular practices. And all the
heathen assented to the eommand of the king.'
Be wanted to make the kingdom strong enough to resist any
designs of the Romans to further weaken his empire by intervening in the internal affairs of the kingdom.

Tarn says:

Antiochus IV knew Rome very well, and, as I see it,
his eonsistent attitude was that there must be no
quarrel with her at any price; what was lost in the
West was lost forever. But the East remained. Rome
had no concern with the East; a new world could there
be called into being to redress the'balance of the
old, and Alexander's empire in Asia, east of the
boundary which Rome had dictated, might be ~estored
without any risk of giving offence to Rome.

\

L

I
~

Antiochus thought,
• • • the success of Rome was due to her centralization, one ruling city and one civilization, and he
set to work, so1Br as he eould, to carry out the
same ideas in hi§ own empire, though naturally on
different lines. 7
His only hope for unity in his polyglot empire was to make
Greek civilization eommon to all and to unify the ruling
force in himself as divine monarch (as Alexander had been),
Olympian Zeus manifest on earth in bodily form.

Be did not

leave his intention to surmise but remodeled his coinage
accordingly and brought out two issues with the Olympian

5. I Mace. 1:41,2.
6. Bactria, p. 190.
7. lbid.

I
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.1.

Zeus enthroned and holding Victory on his hand with the inscription

"2£

BAE

J" I£...n.

~ ANTI O)(OY ()EOZ-£7TlfAIVf)Y~

King Antiochus, God Manifest".8

The king definitely in

the new series forsook the family. god,Apollo, for the Zeus
of Alexander. 9
,
/

)

a. Finance.

The religious basis of the ruling force of

the Seleucids led to the infamous policy of temple plunder
which Antiochus, the Great inaugurated.

The historic policy

of the Seleucids had been one of religious toleration.
Antiochus III himself had followed this course during the
larger part of his reign as his early conduct toward the
Jewish temple proves. IO Jason of Cyrene avers that "kings

I
~

did honor to the place and glorified the temple with most
noble gifts, so that even Seleucus, king of Asia from his
own revenue provided all the expense of the sacrificial
service_"ll
The financial drain following the defeat at Magnesia
necessitated an increase in revenue and the Seleucid rulers,
reversing their former policy, turned to the wealthy temples
for amelioration of their financial stringency.

The first

8. Edward T. Newell, Royal greek Portrait Coins (New
York: Wayte Raymond, Inc., 1937), p. 58, Plate VI, 12,13,14.
9. Loc. Cit.

10.

~.

Ant., 12:3:4-

11. II Macc. 3:2,3.

,
~,
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instance of the use of this method was the pillage of the
temple of Bel in Elam by Antiochus III in which expedition
he lost his life. 12 Seleucus IV continued the policy in a
safer manner.

II Maccabees relates that Heliodorus, the

minister of finance, visited Jerusalem, which was just another
Temple state to him, and attempted to enter the Holy of Bolies
and confiscate the Temple treasure.

The author then says

that the attempt was frustrated by angels who scourged the
would be desecrator of the sanctuary and drove him away.13
Heliodorus is without doubt the "exactor" mentioned in
Daniel. 14 Epiphanes brought pressure upon the Jews by
investing an amenable high priest with authority at Jerusalem.
Thus the money found its way into the royal treasury without
violence. IS

Tarn rejects the story that Epiphanes sought to
sack the temple at Nanaia. 16 Rostovtzeff suggests that he

probably did not need to but resorted to the same means that

r

he had used so successfully at Jerusalem. 17

The latter

12. Strabo 14:1:18.
13. II Macc. 3:1-40. Cf. Swain, pp. 76,7, thinks this
miracle was to cover up intrigue between Beliodorus and the
anti-he11entstic element of the kingdom.
14.

~anie1

lS.

II~.

4:39.

16.

~actria,

Appendix VII.

17.

~.!.,

11:2Q.

p. 1489 n. 115;

II~,

4:39f.

(
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opinion is supported by the statement of Jason of Cyrene that
the priests at Nanaia brought the money out to Antiochus. 18
These exactions were continued in Egypt where nHe had also
sacridegiously despoiled most of the temples. n19 This policy
was not a great success.

The people never admitted the claim

of the Seleucids to be vice-gerents of the gods on earth.
The people met it with a fierce and fanatical resistance
wherever it was projected.
b. Colonization.

The treaty of Apame& forbade the Syrians

to recruit mercenaries from any country west of the Taurus.
If Antiochus were to adhere to the terms of the treaty, the
only possible way for the Seleucids to build up the Qreek
element in their army was to plant Greek colonies in the
realm and seek to curtail infanticide among the Greek
citizens.

The Seleudids were popular among the Greeks so

the natural decision was to follow the policy begun by the
founders of the dynasty, Seleucus and Antiochus. Many of
the colonists were Greek 20 but in the time of Epiphanes it
is not to be assumed that all of the citizens of these colonies were

Greek in race.

By this time there was a large

18. II Macc. 1:15.
19. Polyb. 30:26:9.
20. B. Niese, Geschichte der Griechischen gng Makedonischen Staaten, Vol. III. -rGotha: 1903), p. 95.

,
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group of Hellenized barbarians who were anxious to take up
Greek customs and Greek city life and thus receive the advantages thereby appertaining.

The Seleucids placed these

cities only where the king needed a strong garrison city in
a threatened district.
for foreigners.

They were composed of strangers and

"The interests of these strangers lay in

maintaining the Seleucid power, to which they owed their
privileges and their favoured position to their new country." 21
Epiphanes' aim then was to
• • • knit together the various parts of his empire
by extending and consolidating the net of urban
communities which to some extent existed before
Alexander and was further developed by him and his
successors and by the early Seleucids.
These urban centers were intended to be his points
d'appui. In them the process of amalgamation--social
and cultural--of the upper classes of the population
was far advanced. The idea of Epiphanes was to reap
the results of this natural process and to form out of
the orientalized Greeks and the hellenized Orientals,
mostly reSidents in the cities, one political and
social group, closely knit together round a city life
organized more or less on Greek models, and round a
common Greco-Oriental religion in which the royal cult
should play, an important part. With the help of
this class Epiphanes hoped to solidify the old and
new urban centres of his kingdom, to achieve a more
reliable unity of his empire, and to secure success
in his active foreign policy.22
c. The -rro ~

,>.

The founding of Greek cities was done

in one of two ways; either by planting a new ~DA/S with a

21. W. M. Ramsay, The Cities of St. Paul (New York,
C. Armstrong and Son, 1908)-; p. 157. . 22.

H.!.,

p.

64.
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Greek constitution at some strategic point or by reorganizing and refounding some already existant town as a

/loA

I~

•

The latter process was used in the refounding of Jerusalem
and Babylon. The latter peculiarly kept its native name. 23
Tarn makes this peculiarity one of his proofs that Antiochus
intended Babylon to be his new Capitol in a unified empire.~
There were a good many centers which could not claim the full
I

rank of the7r~Als

but were military colonies.

Much of the

settlement of the Greeks was done indirectly by other cities.

\

This is what enabled it to be done at all, for only
the king could~found a "Trot! IS • • • even the foundation
of a single rr"oA '5 meant for the king hard work. He
had to find land for the city, build the wall, supply
food, seed-corn, cattle and tools to give the people
a start, remit taxation until the city had found its
feet and decide personally innumerable housing, economic and social questions; give a constitution and
get political life started; and settle the city law. 25
The characteristics of a

716A

S in the Seleucid empire

1

differed from and are not to be confused with the classical
,I
I

i

,i
I

'i

~;

'.

Greek city states.

They are difficult to ascertain but to

the best of our knowledge they were the following:
1. Autonomy within the limits of the suzerainty of the

king, "Thus the constitution • • • was a compromise, a sort of

~

I
\

23. Jos. Ant., 12:5.

24. Bactria, pp. 187,8.
25. Ibid., p. 6, N. 1.

~r
I

I
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limited monarchy where democratic freedom and autocratic
rule tempered and restrained each other. 26
2. A wall for protection.
3. Greek political forms

1.~.

A council, an Assembly,

a division of the Greek population into tribes with consequent rotation of prytanies, an elected magistrate and a
gymnasium. 27

"In every Hellenic city the common religion

of the Tribe was an extremely important element in the life
and the thought and the patriotism of all citizens. 28

4. Common religious worship. "The entire body of citi~
I

zens was knit together by their common religion." • • • The
Jews were absolved from the ordinary laws and regulations of
the city, if these conflicted with the Jewish religion:"29
5. The gymnasium was not only the center of physical
training but was the center of intellectual training for the
common man as well. 30 It was the outstanding characteristic
of a

\

\

,

~OA,S.

Indeed "the noblest feature of Greek city life

was its zeal and provision for education.

The minute care-

fulness with which those Asian-Greek cities legislated and
provided for education. • .rouses the deepest admiration. 31
26. W.M. Ramsay, ~ Letters ~ the Seven Churches
(New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1909), p. 131; w. S.
Ferguson, Greek Imperialism (Boston: Boughton Mifflin Co.,
1913), p. 205.
27. Bactria, p. 9.
28. W.M. Ramsay, The Cities Q£ St. Paul, p. 176.
29. W.M. Ramsay, The Letters 12 ~ §even Churches,
p. 148; Cf. Jos. Ant., 12:3:2.
30. tiactria, p. 18; W. S. Ferguson, ~. Cit.
31. W.M. Ramsay, The Letters to the Seven Churches, p. 135.
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6. The king retained no interest in the land. 32
7. The consent of the king was required for a town or a
/"
33
It cost Menelaus 150 talents
colony to become a -,,-o).!$ •
to purchase the privilege for Jerusalem. 34
8. The city controlled its own finances.

In fact it
was a partially self-governing state within a state. 35

p

The Seleucids were always popular with the Greeks.

1

Probably one reason for this is that they favored the Greeks

,

and Greek cities greatly and the Greeks desired to retain
their privileges.

\

One result of this policy was they, the

Seleucids, always kept the citadel of the cities in Greek

I,
/

!

hands. 36

The justification of this policy was demonstrated

in the increase of the Phalanx of Epiphanes to 20,000 as
compared with 16,000 in the army of Antiochus the Great.
the East however the Bactrian

~

In

only set Greek against

Greek and so weakened the power of the Greek race as a whole
that Greek hegemony was shattered by the Orientals and their
Oriental culture, says Tarn. 36a

r
"

32. Bactria, p. 31; W. S. Ferguson,

~.

Cit.

I

33.

~.,

p. 9.

34· il. l!l!££. 4: 9.
35. Bel. Civ., p. 129; W. S. Ferguson,

~.

36. Polyb. 5:48, 14; Bactria, pp. 22,26,32.
36a.Bactria, p. 224.
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2. Eastern Policy.

As we have seen the natural expression

of any ambitions Antiochus Epiphanes might have had for expansion was to find its maximum possibilities in the East.
The work of realigning the eastern satrapies had not been
completed by his father.

Even on his famous "anabasis" for

which he received such acclaim the "Great King" had not reconquered Bactria and for some reason had dropped his campaign against Parthia and made a treaty of alliance with the
king. 37

Be had nonetheless reestablished firmly the

I

\

~.
I,
i

authority of the Selaucids in the East.

Epiphanes now

set out to continue the work of eastern aggrandizement.
His first step was the refounding of Babylon as a ,,-6).u
"with a theatre and at least one Gymnasium"38

As has been

mentioned it is the only city so refounded that kept its
Oriental name.

The coins prove that Antiochus followed this

course with a purpose, for they show the head of the king with
the radiant crown of Helios and with the inscriptionBAr/lllY.L

ANTIOXO Y 2f King Antiochus.

On the reverse side, the

Fortune of Babylon is enthroned like Zeus, holding victory
~I,
i

37. N. C. Debouvois, A Political History of Parthia
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), P7 16,;
Justin 41:5,7.
38. Bactria, p. 192.
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on her hand. 39

"No other city had ever been enthroned on
any king1s coinage. n40 This all points to the intention
upon Epiphanes l part to make

Baby~on

(the city which had

been destined as Alexander's capitol), his own capitol city,
retaining the name it had under "Alexander.
II. THE EGYPTIAN WAR
The Egyptian war was not a part of the plan and
program of Antiochus Epiphanes.

Be wisely determined to

give Rome no reason for offense while he concentrated his
efforts upon the reconquest and reorganization of the eastern
part of his realm as his forefathers had know it in better
days.41 a The king of Syria had been planning an eastern campaign when Egypt became a menace to him on the South.
1. Causes.

In the days of Seleucus IV Ptolemy V had enter-

tained hopes of vengeance against Syria.

Bis father-in-law,

Antiochus III, had seized Coele-Syria during Ptolemy's boyhood and when he grew to manhood he determined to exploit
the disadvantage of the conquered Syrian kingdom to secure
the return of this rich province to Egypt. 4l The loss of
39.

~

Sel. p. 36 nos. 23-30.

40. Bactrla, p. 188.
41a. Supra p.

47.

41. CAB VIII 496.

Pl. XII 1-4.

,
,
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Coele-Syria was a great financial loss to Egypt and we notice
an economic as well as political decline in the southern
kingdom. 42

The untimely death of Ptolemy at the age of

twenty-nine brought these ambitions to a halt.

Cleopatra,'

his wife, became the regent for her son Philometor and in her
capable hands the kingdom was not plunged into war. 43

If it

was true that she received half the revenue from the disputed
border province as claimed, one can see why she was satisfied
to maintain the status guo with Syria. 44

The young queen-

regent too died suddenly and in her youth even as her husband
had done before her leaving her young son in the hands of
two notorious eunuchs as regents. 45
,

I

In order to inhibit the

interference of Rome, they managed to have the official
acclamaltion of the young Philometor a little over a year
after his mother's death at the tender age of sixteen. 46

The

young king was under the complete control of the antiSyrian party in the persons of his two regents Eulaius and

42.

~.!.,

p. 713.

43.

~, ~.

Qii.

44. J. P. Mahaffy, ~ Em~ire 2!
1895), p. 331; l2!. !n1., 12:1 Off.
45.

w.

~

Otto, ~. Cit., p. 1, a~akes l~l the year.

46. Ibid., p. 24; Polyb., 28:12:6.

\\

\

Ptolemy's (London:

,.

Lenaius.

Of them and their influence Otto says,

Schuld hieran ist das neue, besonders unwUrdige
Regiment, das jetzt anstatt der syrischen Konigstochter Igypten geleitet hat; haben es doch Eulaies
und Lenaios, die ja wohl beide Orientalen (s.S.2).
und ehemalige Sklaven waren, gewagt, sich als Vormunder des unmundigen Konigs aufzuspielen und die
Regierung zu usurpieren, wenn sie auch nicht wie
Kleopatra offizielle Regentern geworden sind. Das
Menschen, wie sie, die Herrschaft uber 19ypten
erlangen und langere Zeit behaupten konnten, zeigt
uns des sen Niedergang besonders eindringlich; es
zeigt uns zugleich die'starke Degeneration des einst
so stolzen makedonisch-griechischen Herrenelements,
das sich unwurdigen Orientalen beugte, all das eigentlich nur verstandlich, wenn der ptolemaerhof damals
schon sehr stark das Geprage eines orientalischen
Hofes mit desen Haremswirtschaft und dauernden Haffintrigen getragen hat. Eulaios scheint von den beiden
der FUhrende, Lenaios speziell derjenige gewesen zu
sein, welcher die Verwaltung der Finanzen an sich
gerissen hatte.47
The regents determined to precipitate a war with Syria and
win back Phoenicia and Palestine.

Antiochus while planning

an expedition to the east heard of their plans for war from
I

t

Appolonius whom he had sent as his representative to the
coronation of Philometor. 48

1

Antiochus made a trip of inspection to the border provinces
49
and regarrisoned them with new troops,
sending Meleager at

1

the same time as his envoy to Rome with orders to inform the

1\

Senate and protest that Ptolemy was entirely unjust in
47. ~., p. 24.
48. II ~. 4:21.
49. Otto, ~. Qit., p. 31.
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attacking him.

50

2. First Egyptian Campaign.

Antiochus Epiphanes met the

attack of the Egyptians and was commended for his energetic
daring which Polybius~ who was pro-Egypt,51 termed worthy of
the royal dignity.52

The Egyptian offensive was crushed

above Pelusium and Antiochus at the same time won a naval
victory of Pelusium. 53

In the eyes of Polybius, Antiochus

acted discreditably at.Pelusium either by some ruse in the
battle or by his capture of the young Phi1ometor, whom
Eulaius had advised to flee with his treasure. 54 Bevan holds
that in some manner Antiochus induced the garrison at Pelusium to revolt. 55 Alexandria was terrified and certain that
I

I

Egypt would fall to Antiochus, says Livy in his highly inaccu-

50. Polyb. 37:19.
51. Ibid., 29:23.

1
,

\

51a.W.W. Tarn, review of W. Otto, QQ. Cit. l.ft.§. LV
(1935) p. 98~ says that Otto demolishes any claim of the four
campaigmand definitely proves that there were only two campaigns
in Egypt. Every later writer accepts this view. B. Niese,
QR. Cit. Vol. III, p. 170, N: 2 mentions a three and a four
campaign theory of the Egypt1an war based on a harmonizing
of I & ll~. and Li1l:', 42:29;5--both of which he disallows •.
,IRe puts two Egyptian campaigns in 170-169.
52. Ibid., 28:18.
53.

~

44:19.

54. Polyb. 28:18,21; Diod. Sic., 30:17; Jos. Ant., 12:5:2;
Swain, says, "(they) saw that flight would discredit the king
and thus make them the more indispensible." pp. 80,1.
55. House §!l., pp. 137-9; Diod. Sic. 30:14,18; Daniel
11:26; Polyb., 28:18; 12:5.
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rate account of this struggle. 56

Otto believes that the

citizens of Alexandria were called to arms in their defence. 57
There was a revolution in the Capitol. 58 Tne citizens refused to bow to Antiochus and set up the younger brother of
Philometor as King Euergetes ·11, a title taken from a former
Ptolemy who had been victorious over Syria.
Rome was embroiled in her war with Macedonia which did
not go so well for her in its first stages and the impulsive
Antiochus was encouraged to take advantage of his successful
defense of the border and invade Egypt.

Be made his way from

Pelusium across the Delta to Memphis.
The statement of Jerome that Antiochus was crowned king of
Egypt is borne out by coins found with the effigy of Antiochus
as king of Egypt. We now have found a papyrus (Tebt. 111,1),
in the ordinary form of the kings of Egypt, issuing a decree
to the cleruchs in the Crocodilopolite nome. Otto contends
that Antiochus was merelY9acting as regent for his nephew
as he had done in Syria.'
I

l
I'
I

In the enthusiasm of the moment the impulsive king of Syria
forgot about Rome and his determination to 'avoid trouble with
56. Livy, Loc. Cit.
57. Otto, ~. Cit., pp. 42,3, N. 1.
~
58. A. Bouche Leclercq, Bistoire des peleucides
(Paris: 1913), pp. 255,6.
59. Cf. Otto, QE. Cit., p. 55; Swain, p. 83; Bevan,
Egypt, pp. 285,6.
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her on any account.

If he was crowned, he quickly moved to

obviate any difficulties thereby involved by oPPosing the new
Ptolemy at Alexandria not in his own name as conqueror of
Egypt but in the name of his other nephew Philometor who was
in the camp of Antiochus.

This he thought would win the

Alexandrines over to his side and likewise placate the Greek
world for already emissaries were arriving at Memphis to
blame the war on Eulaius and. plead for mercy for Egypt.

To

this Antiochus replied that he and his nephew were allies.
Be denied being at war with Egypt. 60

He sought the favor of

the Greek element of the Egyptian population by such expedients
as presenting each of the Greek residents of Naucratis with a
gold stater. 6l Otto contends that Antiochus sought to win
62
The natives of
over the Egyptian native element to himself.
Egypt had been extremely restive ever since they had fought
side by side with Greeks at Raphia.

They had made trouble

for Ptolemy V continuously and their revolt may have been the
reason that Ptolemy V did not prosecute his projected invasion
of Coele-syria before he died. 63
!•

60. Polyb. 28:20,23.
61. IbiS·
62. otto, QQ. Cit., p. 55.
63. Bevan,

Eg~Rt,

pp. 273ff.

Our sources all corroborate

61
/,

1

the statement of Daniel that Antiochus Epiphanes was a
master of intrigue. 64
In any event Antiochus continued his march on

Alexandria and besieged the city.

The Alexandrines under

Euergetes II made a stout resistance.

A sudden report that

Jerusalem had risen in his rear caused Antiochus to raise
the Siege and hasten off to quell the new disturbance which
menaced his supply lines.

Be left Philometer in Memphis and

also left a large garrison at Pelusium thus holding the key
in Egypt in order to invade it when he chose leaving the two
brothers to fight it out for Egypt and then purposing to
destroy whichever of them was the victor. 65

3. Revolt in Antioch (Jerusalem).

II Maccabees explains

that the reason for the revolt at Jerusalem was that Jason,
whom Antiochus had replaced as high priest, while liYling as
an exile had heard that Antiochus had died.

He thus struck

suddenly at Jerusalem seeking to dislodge his brother who
had succeeded him and thus present the successor to Antiochus
with a fait accompli and perhaps be retained in the high
priesthood by the new Seleucid ruler.
lem.

Jason stormed JerusaThe Jewish masses were on his side. 66 ~ben he failed

64. Daniel 11:20.
65. Livy 45:11.

66. CAB VIII, 505.
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to take the citadel where Menelaus had taken refuge, his
troops looted the city.67

Antiochus, thinking that Judea was

in revolt "set out from Egypt like a wild beast and took the
city by storm. "68

Jason of Cyrene tells in ex~erated lang-

uage of the brutality of the Syrian soldiers as they too
were loosed upon the city.69

Of course the loyal hellenists

as citizens of the 1TO~/S would be spared.
!1

They were the loyal

•

neucleus of the city who had held the citadel for the king.
Both First and Second Maccabees state that at this
time Antiochus Epiphanes despoiled the Temple. 70 .Be is said
to have taken away 1800 talents from the temple and in the
language of an enemy, "hurried off to Antioch, thinking in
his arrogance that he would make the land navigable and the

67. There were two parties at least in Jerusalem. The
citizens of Antioch, the Greek city and their hellenized
sympathizers formed one party. The strict Jews and antihellenistic people would naturally form another party which
was probably pro-Egyptian. Jason was a hellenist. .Be had
been the leader of the hellenizing movement in Judea. His
act was not pro-Egyptian nor anti-Syrian so much as it was
Anti-Menelaus. Jason hoped to replace Menelaus under the
Seleucid rule now that Antiochus was dead (as he thought).
68. II~. 5:5-14. Swain, p. 84., places this episode
at the close of the Second campaign-against most authorities •
.Be refuses to accept this as the cause behind Antiochus'
departure from Egypt, Swain thinks Antiochus left Egypt to
prosecute his Eastern Campaign giving his alliance with
Philometer as his excuse (Cf. Polyb. 28:23:4f). W. Kolbe,
Qy. Cit., p. 152; Otto QQ. Q!1., pp. 66ff.
69. Ibid.
70. 1

Me££.

1:20-24; II M!££. 5:l5ff.
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sea traversable on foot, he was so intoxicated in his mind."71
4. Period between Campaigns.

With Egypt in a turmoil, Judea

pacified, his treasury replenished from the loot of Egypt and
Jerusalem and his army victorious, Antiochus was in an excellent position.

Be could settle down in his capitol and there

keep in touch with the result of the Third Macedonian War and
then take suitable steps as. the opportunity afforded itself.
The first siege of Alexandria spread dismay in the
economic and commercial world. 72 Egypt had been a strong
sea power in the Aegean and her trade was especially important to Rhodes.

They at the suggestion of Rome sent an
embassy to Antiochus urging peace. 73 After the siege Antiocmus
sought the good wishes of the Greeks and the Romans by sending
an embassy to Rome with 150 talants, 50 for the Romans and 100
to be distributed among the Greek cities on the way.74

These

presents served to soften the refusal of Antiochus to cease
hostilities, for even Rome had sent envoys headed by Titus
Numisius to try to make peace; but they had "returned to Rome
without achieving anything at all."75
I,

I
I

71. II Me££. 5:21.
72.

Hous~

Sel., p. 140.

73. Polyb. 28:23. 28 :17.:4; 28:23.
74. Ibid. , 28:22.
75. Ibid. , 29:25:1-5.

Perseus was still in

,
64

the field so Antiochus was in a position to be adamant.
The Achaeans were about to send aid to Egypt during
the winter but petty Roman jealousies interfered and Egypt
was left to her own devices. 76 In this state the brothers
P.tolemy recognized the wisdom of working together.

"Autio-

chos st{tait tromp' une foi de plus, et toujours parce qutil
s'exageiait l'incapacite' des ses adversalres. t ,77

Cleopatra II,

their Sister, seemed to have been the moving genius behind
the rapprochement.

The Alexandrines opened their gates to

Philometor and thus obviated any difficulty in the way of
recognition by Antiochus Epiphanes.

Both of the brothers
~

,.-

now wore the crown and exercised the royal e ~ 0 uo-tc:r, authority.78

Antiochus struck as soon as the news arrived that the

brothers were united.

Polybius said that Antiochus forgot

all that he wrote and spoke about merely desiring to put the
rightful king on the Egyptian throne.

l.p fA- E. \/
5.

1ft l

~cond

,"

moralized Polybius,

EgYptian Campaign.

"XtA-~E-7rOv.1~ (TBA fJ V

II is hard 12. ~ ~. 79

The Syrian fleet took Cyprus

as soon as the army had begun its march south.

From Pelusium

the Syrian soon overran all of Egypt but Alexandria for the
second time.

i

At Rhinocolura envoys arrived from Philometor

76. l.bid,., 29: 23 •
./

77. Bouche-Leclercq , Qll.
78. lPj.d. 29:23:5;
79. Polyb. 29:26.

Ci~.,

il!l 45:11.

p. 258.
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offering thanks to his

unc~e

and stating that all was well

and the throne had been regained to his satisfaction.
ochus'

u~timatum

demanding Cyprus and Pelusium

with its surrounding country.

A time limit was attached to

rep~y

was an

Anti-

the demand. 80

Time was precious for the decision ei~her

had been already made or soon would be in Macedonia.

If Rome

should win, Antiochus only hope was to present Rome with a
fait

There was no hope save in Rome for EgYpt.

~mRli.

6. Eleusis and
at Pydna.

aft~.

June 22, 168, saw the doom of Perseus

Victorious Rome could now settle accounts with

the Easterner.

At Eleusis about four miles from Alexandria

a Roman embassy

~ed

by C. Popilius Laenas met Antiochus.

The king recognized the Romans from his long stay in the
Roman capitol.

He knew the Roman mind and doubtless guessed

their mission.

The churlish Roman acted in a most offensive

and

arrogant manner.

exceeding~y

He refused to greet the

king until he had delivered his ultimatum that the Syrian
withdraw from Egypt and Cyprus at once.

When Antiochus asked

for time to consider the matter, the Roman drew a circle
around the king, with his

wal~1ng

stick, and forbad him to

leave the circle until he had a reply for Rome.

Antiochus

Epippanes was not ready to try conclusions with Rome just

(-

-----80. Li vy,

~9C.

gi.;t •.
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yet and there was but one possible reply, acquiescense to
all that Rome demanded. 81
Polybius said that Rome could act in Egypt because
Perseus'fate had been decided.

Bad Antiochus not been certain

of this "'he would never,' I think, 'have obeyed the Roman
behests.,,,82

After the fixed number of days Antiochus and his

whole army left Egypt "deeply hurt and complaining indeed."
Popilius then hurried up to Cyprus to see that the Syrian
troops were evacuated. 83 Otto looked upon Eleusis as the
end of all Antiochus 1 hopes.

i-

, .I

Be says:

Der Tag von Eleusis, der den Konig so Plotzlich um
all seine Hoffnungen gebracht hatte, das Ungluck, das
ihm zugestoszen war, bat ihn nicht gefestigt, sondern
hat ihn zerschlagen. Das zwiespaltige Bild, das, anscbeinend unau~geblicben, in der antiken Uberlieferung
uns entgegentritt, beruht docb wohl darauf, dasz der
in seinem -Innersten getroffene Mann sich damals stark
gewandelt hat. Der bizarre, ja etwas leichtfertige
Zug, der diesem von Haus ausbegabten, von sich selbst
uberzeugten Menschen zu eiger gewesen sein musz, ist
unter dem unerwarteten Schicksalsschlage, der ihn
betroffen hat, zum bestimmenden Zuge seines Wesens
geeworden; der Konig wurde ein innerlich zerrissener,
nervoser Mansch. Er hat sicb durch tolle Streiche,
durch verschwenderishe Hanlungen, die ihm seine
unbeschrankte Konigliche Macht zu zeigen schienen, zu
betauben versucht, hat sich eben immer wieder, um das
auf ibm lastende Minderwertigkeitsgefuhl zu uberwinden,
vorzuspiegelnversucht, dasz or, der Groszkonig ASiens,
noch etwas vermocbte, und bat dementsprechend gehandelf,
sich weiter grosze Ziele gesteckt. 84
81. Polyb. 29:27; Livy 45:12; Diod. Sic. 31:2; App.
Syr. 66; Justin 34:3:1f.
82. Polyb. 29:27:12,13.
83. Ibid. 29:27.
84. W. Otto. QR. Cit., p. 84.
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In contrast to this gloomy picture Bevan says that Antiochus
had turned from bankrupcy to riches and had changed the
balance of power in the East against the Romans' will. 85
Tarn takes up the cudgels with Otto, contending that Antiochus
expected to be turned out of Egypt and did not mind failure
in this adventure, for it was not a real objective with him
but only a rash hope. 86 All must agree with Tarn that the
day at Eleusis demonstrated great self-control on the part
of a fiery character such as Antiochus Epiphanes, who
swallowed the insult, with a victorious army at his back,
and an insulting boor before him. 87
Soon thereafter Antiochus sent envoys to Rome to congratulate them upon their victory over Perseus.

They

"assured the Senate that their king regarded the peace which
the Senate had imposed as preferable to any victory".

and

that commands of the gods would not have been more dutifully
obeyed. 88

IV. THE EAST
1 .•

Firs~ East~ Q.amI!~:!:.in.

Soon after the Egyptian struggle

Antiochus Epiphanes came to agreement with Eucratides.

He

85. House Sel., p. 140.
86. Bactria, p. 192; Swain, p. 87, considers Torri's
argument here to be conclusive.
87. Ibid..
88. Livy 45:13.

1
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recognized him as king and sponsored his campaign to win
Bactria.

Rostovtzeff insisys that Eucratides was an independent king. 89 Tarn contends that they had divided the

potential Seleucid realm into two parts with Antiochus as
ruler of the West and Eucratides as sub-king in the East
after they had conquered it. 90 It does not seem unreasonable to presume that the two men were in some sort of agreement under which Eucratides went east in the name of tbe
Seleucid king to wrest tbe Satrapy of Bactria from tbe
Euthydymids who had asserted their independence of their
Seleucid masters.

Antiocbus for his part was to settle

affairs in the west and then the two armies were to attad:
the rebels in Parthia from the east and the west in a concepted

89.

R.!.,

p. 1493, n. 125.

90. Bactria, p. 203. Tarn worked out this hypothesis
in an effort to discover a sufficient justification for the
JrD~~~at Daphne (which was a Greek form of Triumph). He
could not follow otto and the older historians in accepting
the Egyptian War as such a justification. In casting about
for a solution to this problem Tarn discovered that the chronology generally accepted for Eucratides and the EuthydMmids
was by no means definite. He then was the first to study the
whole problem intenSively. His investigation led him to make
Eucratides contemporary with Antiochus Epiphanes (in fact he
claims they were second cousins). With Eucratides as a subking, Antiochus could then claim his victories as Antiochus t
own and thus celebrate a triumph at Daphne which would match
that of Aemilius Paullus and at· the same time demonstrate\..'·
that his ambitions were centered in the East, (Cf. Below
p. 71). This view is now accepted in its essentials (Cf. n.
89 also Swain).

,
I
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drive.

If this hypothesis is correct (and it seems quite

plausible), Eucratides called upon the loyalty of the Greek
cities of Bactria, raised the standard of revolt against the
usurpers and in

a brief

period of time with a small force

became in the name of Antiochus the "Savior" of Bactria •
........

This title crw

T

I'( f'

had the special significance of an

individual rescuing a territory from an opponent--in this
case rescuing the Seleucid cities of Bactria from the rebel
Euthydymid, Demetrius. 91
The ease of the victory in Bact~ia can be explained
according to Tarn 92 by two closely connected facts which
seemed to be well known to both Eucratides and Antiochus.
The Euthydymids in their bid for power had definitely gone
counter to the policy of the Seleucids which favored the
Greeks over the Iranians.

Naturally the Greek citizens would

resent the loss of their special favors and would look to any
general for help who would be disposed to restore them to
their favored position.

Again because of the special favor

of the Seleucids, the Greek-Macedonian settlers of the Seleucid
kingdom were always loyal to the person of the reigning
Seleucid when it was possible.

91. Ibid., pp. 175, 204.
92. Ibid., p. 202.

So it was the most natural

1
,
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thing in the world for the Greeks in Bactria to look upon
Antiochus as their "Savior" and as they were the military
back-bone of the country their assistance to Eucratides
would be decisive.
This victory on the part of Antiochus Epiphanes t

ally

enabled Antiochus to flaunt his triumph at Daphne in the
face of the Rome which had so degraded him at Eleusis.
,-

2. The -rtojJ- 7r'l at Daphne.

The festival at Daphne was a

direct answer to the "games celebrated in Macedonia by Aemilius Paullus. !!w93

'rha t i t was primarily a military triumph

on the Greek style is indicated by the fact that the first
section of the procession was the review of Antiochus t strong
army--stronger than that of his father at Magnesia. 94
Polybius t vivid description of Antiochus army is classic.

i •

f .

It was headed by five thousand men in the prime of
life armed after the Roman fashion and wearing
breastplates of chain armor. Next came 5000 Mysians,
and immediately behind them 3000 Cilicians, armed in
the manner of light in£antry, wearing gold crowns,
Next came .3000 Thracians and 5000 Gauls. They were
followed by 20,000 Macedonians of whome 10,000 bore
golden shields, 5000 brazen shields and the rest
silver shields. Next marched 250 pairs of gladiators,
and behind them 1000 horsemen: from Nisa and .3000
from Antioch itself; most of them had crown and
trappings of gold and the rest trappings of silver.
Next to these came the so-called "companion cavalry,"
numbering about 1000, all with gold trappings, and
next the regiment of "royal friends" of equal number
and similarly accoutred; next 1000 picked horse

9.3. Athen. 5:194, 10:139=Polyb. 30:25:1
94. Ibid., Bactria, p. 194; Supra 53.

,
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,

followed by the so-called "agema" supposed to be the
crack cavalry corps, numbering about 1000. Last of
all marched the ftcataphract" or mailed horse, the
horses and men being armed in complete mail as the
name indicated. Of these too there were about 1500.
All the above wore purple surcoats in many cases embroidered with gold and heraldic designs. Next came
100 chariots drawn by six horses and 40 drawn by four
horses, and then a chariot drawn by four elephants
and another drawn by a pair, and f~allY 36 elephants
in single file with their housings. ,
One notices immediately that the elephants were in
the second most important section of the parade--the final
section.
forbade

This direct breach of the treaty of Apamea which
~

keeping

warning to Rome

~

~

elephants !1 all

Antiochus

~ ~

~

to

~

another brazen
trifled with.

Only if Antiochus had been victorious elsewhere than in
Egypt would be have been in a position to flaunt this breach
of the treaty so deliberately.
The predilection of the ancient writers to ignore
anything but western history has deprived us of information
and likewise imposed upon our evaluations in this period of
history a distinct western bias.

A dated inscription affords

the information that Antiochus went to Babylon during the
summer following the Spring Festival at Daphne, and there
celebrated in August-September 166 )(O(l'tr;~p (~.

The

inscription records a gift made to Epiphanes by Philippus,
who may be the Philip mention in II Maccabees as Antiochust

95. Ibid.
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96
minister for affairs.
as "Savior of ASia. n97

The inscription refers to Antiochus

,-

The term X~f'~"'£f c~ signifies a sacrifice of thanksgiving for something which the celebrant considered
a deliverance. • .he (AntiochuS) must have attached
great importance to holding them at his destined
capitol, or he would never have gone to Babylon in
the hot weather; they wer~ obviously a thanksgiving
for the "saving of Asia n98
during the first Eastern campaign with the assistance of
Eucartides either as ally or sub-king. 99
Antiochus now brought out a new series of coins upon
which Zeus has the features of Antiochus and he now takes
the full title BAr/AEY£ ANTIO){OY' BEOr E7TI;ANHE.

HIK.H +OP II

,

of King Antiochus, god manifest, victorious. IOO

Eucratides made a campaign into India but failed to
accompliSh his mission there and in 159 was slain in battle
by the parthians. 10l
3. Second Eastern Campaign.

Antiochus to the best of his

knowledge in 165 had settled things in Jud.a and set out
for the East.

He reduced Armenia and forced the king to

acknowledge his supremacy.102

Next he went to Elymals.

96. II. ~. 13:23.
97. OGIS, 253.
98. Bactria, p. 195.
99. H.!., pp. 1493.
100. BMC, Sel., p. 61, No. 27; Newell, QQ. Cit. p. 58
Plate VI, No. 14.
101. Bactria, p. 212.
102. App. Syr., 45,66; Diod, Sic. 31:17a.
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Tarn insists that this was a peaceful visit to Susa and connects it with his marriage to the goddess Atargatis. l03 He
then went to Gabae on the road to Ecbatana. 104 The king was
Showing his might to his vassals on his way eastward to
attack Hekatompylos, the capitol of Parthia.

Tarrt0~ays that

Eucratides was in India at the time and could not join him
in the campaign, but Antiochus had the main army with him and

would have been fully able to cope with the Parthia of his
day just as his father would have been in his had not death
taken them both so suddenly, for Epiphanes died at Gabae106
of ~8'4r'5

consumption, the disease which had cut down so
many of the Macedonian kings. l07
Thus he died in his youth and the kingdom was left to
~he

mercy of the dynastic struggles of the family and the

watchful hindrance of the Romans.

Otto gives us a gloomy

summary which seems distorted.
Als Epiphanes im Fruhjahr 163 v. Chr. Vorzeitig,
wohl and der Schwindsucht, fern 1m osten in der
Landschaft PerSis starb, da war das Seleukidenreich,
das er zu einer wirklichen Groszmacht wieder zu
erheben gehofst hatte, bereits ein endgultig ge·c"

10.3. Bactria, p. 193; App. Syr., 46.

--

104. II Macc. 9:1.
105. Bactria, pp. 214,5.
106. Polyb. 31:9.
107. App. Syr. , 66; Cf. li~· 9:1,2.

,
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brochener Statt, vollig hilflos gebenuber dem rucksichtslosen Streben Roms nach Sicherheit und Baherrschung des Ostens. Und so is ein Mann wie Antiochus
trotz seines groszen Strebens, durch das er aber mit
Rom in Gegensatz kommen muszte, sum Totengraber
swines Sta~tes geworden; 108
While Antiochus lived Rome regretted not enforcing the disarmament clauses of the treaty of Apamea.

This is proved by

the fact that they saw to it that the Syrian army was wrecked immediately after he had died. 109 But Antiochus' army
was stronger than that of his father, AntiochusIII, and many
Romans knew that had there been competent generalship at
Magnesia the outcome might well have been a different story
altogether.
The reputation of Antiochus Epiphanes in the world
was great.

Polybius said that his "power was irresistible.,,110

Jason of Cyrene says that he was nstronger than any other
king. nlll Had he lived but two more years Tarn assures us
that he would have finished the conquest of Parthia and
then would have been able to join Eucratides in Bactria and
they together· might have been able to reestablish the kingdom
of Alexander in the East.

As it was he failed because he

died.

108. W. Otto, Q£. Cit., p. 88.
109. App. Syr., 46; Zonaris 9:25=Dio. 20:69.
110. Diod. Sic. 31:17a=Polyb.
111. II

i\

~.,

1:13.
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The Seleucid empire was never the same again.

The

Jews were able to free themselves from the declining power
of the succeeding Seleucids whose internecine strife for the
benefits of the declining kingdom finally destroyed it.
Antiochus had greatly weakened the power of the Greeks in the
Farther East and caused the failure of the 'promising experiment
of the Euthydymids in India.

I
I

CHAPTER V
ANTIOCHUS AND THE JEWS

CHAPTER V
ANTIOCBUS AND THE JEWS
Once the fact is established that Antiochus was primarily
interested in the East and there based his ambitions for the
renascence of the Seleucid Empire, the other events in his
reign fall naturally into their proper

p~rspective.

The

Egyptian War, known as the Sixth Syrian War, becomes a side
issue.

In preparation for the Eastern Campaign Antiochus

needed a· settled border in his rear.

His early successes by

their magnitude and ease prompted him to overreach himself
temporarily and seize for himself the diadem of Egypt.

This

foolhardy step was quickly repented of and the crown
relinquished in favor of his young nephew Philometor.

By the

same token the Maccabean struggle with the Seleucids is dimmed

II
I

to its proper magnitude.

Antiochus did not consider the

problem worthy of his personal

attentio~neither

did he

allow it to deter his projected campaign in the Be.·st.

The

king cannot completely shake off the onus of his persecution
but the barbaric savagery of the execution of the king's
commands should probably be attributed to the underlings who
in their hatred of the Jews gave free reign to their sadistic

natures. l

1. Cf. below, p. 9lf.

I'
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I. JEWISH POST·&XILIC PERIOD

I

1. Oriental Phase.

The captivity in Babylon destroyed the

historic Jewish kingdom.

After a period of about seventy

years small groups of pious Jews were allowed to make their
way back to their homeland.

There they rebuilt their ancient
shrine and often found the Satraps easy masters. 2 This was

made possible by the liberal policy of the Persians.

Under

Cyrus, the Persians, who had surplanted the Babylonian rulers,
sought the good will of subject peoples by allowing them
some privileges.

Under the Persian rule

religious devotees lived quietly

in~ir

~his

small band of

holy city.

The

virtual autonomy of the Persian period allowed the development of a well-organized ruling caste of priests. 3
2.

~reek

phase.

Suddenly into the comparative quiet of

the Persian empire plunged Alexander.
toppled.

The power of Persia

The world wondered at the ease with which the

empire was overcome.

Daniel pontrays Persia as a two-horned

ram attacked by a he-goat (the symbol of Alexander).

He says,

"the ram had no power to stand before him, he cast him to the
ground, and trampled upon him, there being none to rescue the
2. Max Radin, In! l~ ~mong the Greeks and ~ Bomans
(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America,
1915), p. 57.

3. Ibid., p. 61.
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ram from his power. n4

Thus it seemed to the innocent

bystander in Judea.
a. Alexander.

Alexander was not, however, just another

military conqueror.

His conquest was as much a conquest in

the realm of culture as it was in the realm of military.5
He openly sought to carry the civilization of Hellas to the
barbarians.

His policy of Hellenization was later modified

and recognition was given to the distinct advantages discovered among the Persians.

nThe union of oriental and occidental was attempted in every city of western ASia. n6 His
early death opened the way for a continuous series of wars
of succession on the part of his generals and their descendants.
b. The

Ptolem~s.

A few short years after Alexander's

death, Ptolemy I had secured his grip upon Coele-Syria and
Palestine remained a part of the EgYptian empire for 122
years. 7 "The successors to Alexander retained his strong
Hellenistic bent, and Palestine. • .in a special sense,
might be regarded as having borne ~ brunt of ~ Hellen8
1stic attack."
Ramsay says that the Hellenizing policy of

4. Daniel 8:7f.
5. J. McKee Adams, "The Struggle Q£ the Jews with
Hel enism" (A TheSiS, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
1927 , p. 237.
6. W.M. Ramsay, The Cities of St. Paul (New York: C.
Armstrong and Son, 1908), p. 88.
7. Supra, p. 18.
8. J. McKee Adams, ~. ~.

I,
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the Macedonian rulers was a noble and generous one expecially
in the realm of education and produced excellent results in

Western Asia generally.

9

The most efficient methods that the Greeks used in

.
,

their attempts to hellenize the Jews were permeating and
fusive.

They did not use force until Epiphanes' reign.

Under

Philadelphus an intricate system of sugliemental commercial
routes was opened up which made communication through
Palestine easier and thus brought the forces of Hellenism
into readier contact with the Jews. lO The extension of
religious favors to the Jews nopened the hearts of the Jewish
leaders at Jerusalem. nll The intermingling of peoples in the
empire naturally aided in establishing the dominant culture
throughout the realm.
In order to develop the economic life of Egypt and thus
facilitate the collection of large sums of money as taxes,
the Ptolemies introduced the Greek business man who demanded
pOSition and privilege.

Other Hellenized peoples were

distributed through the empire and the Jews themselves went
out from their native land and in dwelling among other
9. W. M. Ramsay, QQ. £!1., p. 182.
10. Ibid., pp. 223-5.
11. Ibid; Jos. !g1. (12:2:5-10), mentions munificent gifts
by the Ptolem~es to the Temple at Jerusalem. There is no
mention of any interruption of the Temple worship save in III
Maccabees which is worthless historically. The need for a
translation of the Jewish Law (known as the Septuagint),
indicates progress in the Hellenization of the Jews.

1
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peoples subjected themselves to the forces of the foreign or
1gentile culture. 2
The Greek cities founded in the land were centers of
Greek culture.
L'esprit tolerant et sceptique de l'hellenisme se
propageait dans les regions d'alentour, a mesure que
les colonies greco-macedoniennes s'implantaitent
,.,soutour du lac de Genezareth et dans l~vallee du
Jourdain. La race Juive, deja dispersee dans la
vaste triangel compris entre Babylone, Ephese et
Alexandrie, et merne plus loin en Cyrenaique, paraissait ne plus offrir dans sa patrie un groupe assez
compact pour resister longtemps ~ la civilization
hellenique qui commencait a la cerner de toutes
parts. Les colonies grecques formaient autour de la
Palestine comme un cercle qui allait se resserrant
de plus en plus. 13
The Ptolemies were builders of cities in Palestine for the
country was in a recalcitrant mood.

Each city was built with

purely military and political objects in

~w.

There was a

line of coastal cities from Gaza to Phoenicia, another east
of the Jordan and a line to the South of Idumaea. 14

There

were numbers of Greek and Macedonian settlers as well as
Hellenized orientals in these cities.

Ramsay says,

There is rarely a case in which the Greeks formed the
sole population of a city which they founded in a
12. QAtl VII, 111,2.
13. Bouche-Leclercq, Histoire ~ Seleucids (Paris:
Adams, (QQ.Cit., p. 237), says that
there are more ruins of Greek walled cities in Palestine than
in any other similar area in all the world. "In this circle
of Greek towns Judea was undoubtedly a survival of the past,"
(CAB VII, 192).
.

1913,4), pp. 236,7.

I',

14.

~.!.,

P. 346; Bouche-Leclercq,

~.

Cit; CAB VII, 192.

-,
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foreign land. The strength and permanence of the
Greek colonies was due to their power of assimilating
the native population and imparting to it something of
their own genius and aspirations. 15
Another element contributing to the hellenizing process
among the Jews was the so-called dispersion. 16 From personal
choice and by royal policy the dispersion of the Jews was
extended throughout the Ptolemaic and Selucid realms.

This

situation continued until there were, in the day when Judea
gained her independence, as many Jews outside Judea as were
in it.17

These scattered Jews remained, to a certain extent,

faithful to their religious shrine.
their contact with the homeland.

This fidelity maintained

They were however at the

very least mildly hellenized and thus brought to their own
people some of the results of their contact with the
Hellenistic world.

Jouguet says, ftAlexandrian Jewry was so
hellenized that it could hardly speak anything but Greek. n18

15. W. M. Ramsay, Q£. Cit., p. 121.

I
I

16. Bevan, (House Sel., pp. 165,6), mentions five lines
of admitted evidence on the Diaspora or Dispersion of the
Jews. 1. There were other orientals in the Greek world in
the fourth century. 2. A hellenized Jew visited Aristotle
(Jos. Contra Apion I, 176). J. Large numbers of Jews never
returned from the Exile in Babylon. 4. In Judas Maccabeas l
day Jews lived in Galilee and the Transjordan region. 5. The
papyri tell of the Jews in Egypt and their strong influence.
17. Max Radin, QR. Cit., p. 63.
18. Pierre Jouguet, Macedonian Imperialism and ~he
Hellenization of the ~ (New York: Knopf, 1932;;-p. 377.
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It is significant that tradition states that the Jewish
Scriptures were translated into the Greek during the reign
of Ptolemy 11. 19
Of course it is to be expected that the Jew was not the
only one affected by a mingling of peoples of differing
cultures and religions.
world of his day.20

The Jew was a force in the religious

He had a marked influence upon Gentile

thinkers.
The Jewish insistence upon one supreme God, completely
other than man, worshipped without images, in a temple
where His presence was symbolized by darkness and
silence, appealed to the best thought 0flthe time
which was moving • • • toward monotheism.
c. The ,§eleucids.
Rule.

The Jews were not adverse to Syrian

Josephus says that they welcomed Antiochus III as a

deliverer and assisted him in holding the country against
the Egyptian general, Scopas. 22 There was however no change
in the policy of Hellenism within Judea when the Seleucids
gained control of Palestine.

"While those rulers

~Seleucids

and Ptolemies), were engaged in an incessant struggle among
themselves, thel

~

never s1 variance QU

~he

issue of

19. Jos Ant., 12:2.
20. Hguse Sel., p. 164.
21. Dodd, The.Bible and the Greeks, p. 243, quoted in
W.O.E. Oesterly, The~ ~ Judaism during the Greek Period
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 21.
22. Jos. Ant., 12:3:3.

I
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Hellenization_ n23

Ferguson says, nThe most striking fea-

ture in the internal policy of the Seleucids is the attempted
transfer! into Asia of .the urban form of life theretofore
characteristic of Hellas. n24

The Jews were especially popular as colonists with the Seleucids. 25 The religious privileges
granted them kept their loyalty to the Seleucids steadfast.
Their religious peculiarities marked them off from other men
and kept them from uniting with other races against the king.
The only breach in relations between the Jews and Antiochus
the Great or Seleucus IV was during the attempted raid upon
the treasury of the Jewish temple by Heliodorus, the minister
of finance forSeleucus IV. 26 There was no change in policy
caused by the change of the Jews from Egyptian to Syrian rule.
II. ANTIOCHUS' POLICY OF HELLENIZATION
1. General folicy.

The general policy of Antiochus Epiphanes

23. Adams, Q2. Cit. p. 238.
24- w. S. Ferguson, Greek Imperialism (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1913), p. 196.
25. E. R. Bevan, The Legacl of ~srael (Oxford: 1928),
p. 36. Here Bevan states that Antiochus III sent 2QQG Jews
into Lydia and Phrygia as military colonists and used them as
a counterweight against the Greeks and the natives; Cf. Jos.
Ant., 12:3:1; Ramsay, Q2. Cit. p. 174ff.
26. Supra, pp. 24; 49,50.
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I

has been set forth in another connection. 27

The problem now

to be considered is the application of the policy by Antiochus to his realm as a whole and then seek to follow its
application as it specially affects the Jews.
Antiochus Epiphanes was the last prosecutor of a
vigorous policy of Hellenization. 28 The kingdom was rapidly
becoming orientalized as he came to the throne.

H1s father

had founded many cities to counteract this tendency,29 but
the population had quickly turned Aramaean in t he late
Seleucid period through the influence of the unhellenized
women. 3D otto declares, "dasz fur ihn die Kunst der Politik
schon zur, Kunst des Unmoglichen geworden war. n31 As usual
Otto's gloomy predictions concerning Antiochus seem to overdraw the dark side of the picture.,' Antiochust policy met with
signal success until he used force.

Swain argues that

Antiochus in conjunction with Eumenes II of Pergamum was
seeking a resurgence of the Greeks in the face of an Oriental
renascence.

He has strong arguments in that Antiochus did

27. Supra, 47-55.
28. W. S. Ferguson, Qp,. Ci't., p. 195. Cf. W. Kolbe,
Beitrage zur Syrischen und Judischen Geschichte. (Berlin:
1926), p. 151.
--- -29. Cf. Livy, 37:54,22.
30. CAH VII 194.
31. W. Otto, Zur Geschicte
(wissenschaften: 1934), p. S5.
!
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cultivate the Greek world through generous gifts to Greek
cities (p. 78); in his passive policy in the face of Rome
(p. 78); in his kindness to the Greeks at Naucratis in
Egypt; and in his sparing of the Greek soldiers in the army
of Ptolemy after the battle at Pelusium (p. 81).

In the

face of the Oriental menace one would naturally suppose
that Antiochus would oppose them.

Many of Swain's tenuous

suppositions, however, seem unjustified.

His theory on the

mission of Heliodorus to the Jewish Temple (pp. 76,7); his
supposition that only the Greek soldiers were spared after
Pelusius; his assumption that Eulaeus and Lenaeus had
"effected what amounted to a nationalistic revolution giving
orientals positions and power once held by the Greeks"
(pp. 74,5), are unconvincing.

Swain then fortifies this

last assumption with the declaration that the regents went
bankrupt because the Greeks would not pay taxes to them (p. 75)
and his proof in that Eulaeus coined some currency in his own
name and debased it.
Antiochus was a throughgoing enthusiast for things
Greek.

That no one doubts..

But Antiochus' whole policy of

Hellenization was an attempt to convert Orientals to Greek
culture, not to dispossess the Orientals for the benefit of
the

Gree~

race.

How could he hope to succeed in such a

policy ··were he. to close the door to Greek life to anyone not
,

(

of Greek blood?

Ramsay has proved that Antiochus settled

some Jews at Tarsus, which he refounded as Antioch, 171 B.C. 32
These Jews were full citizens of thelfOA,s

with special

exemption from the religious obligations of citizenship.33
At Jerusalem Jews sought and gained the reconstitution of

"'"
their city as a lroAI$

on the Greek model. 34

The coronation

of Antiochus as king of Egypt at the hands of the native
priests at Memphis was indicative of the fact that he sought
to please the natives of Egypt rather' than to dispossess them.
This was a continuation of the pro-native policy begun by
Ptolemy V nwhich included extensive concessions to the
natives. n35 One concludes that Rostovtzeff is nearer the
truth when he says that Antiochus sought nto legalize a process of amalgamation between orientals and Greeks which had
apparently made great progress. n36 Such a plan would suit
the needs of the hour more definitely and also match more
perfectly with the facts as revealed in the sources.

The

racial issue cannot be injected successfully by Swain.

32. W. M. Ramsay, QR. Cit., pp. 180ff.
33. Ibid.
34. II

~.

4:9.

35. Swain, p. 86; Cf. Supra, p. 60; Papyrus Tebtunis 698.
36. fl.!-, 703.
,

.

,
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2. Jewish Hellenization.

During the first part of his reign

Antiochus no doubt "considered himself as the best friend of
the Jewish race, and was so considered by many of the most
influential Jews in Jerusalem.,,37

In fact he had a special

interest in Jerusalem and later as an act of signal favor he
gave it his own name.
When Antiochus came to power he found that Onias III
the high-priest at Jerusalem was doing all within his power
to impede the process of Hellenization among his people. 38
An enemy of

Onias~.

Joshua by name, offered Antiochus 440

talents if he would make him high priest. 39

When this was

acceded to Joshua, who had now hellenized his name to Jason,
offered 150 talents to the king if he would constitute the
ci ty of Jerusalem as a Greek-rlOA '.5 .40

"When the king had

consented, and he had taken office, he immediately brought
his countrymen over to the Greek way of living. n41

The

special royal ordinances favoring the Jews were abrogated,
the people put on new customs, the Gymnasium and the Greek

""

I.

37. RQuse Sel. p. 169. "The conservative party was overborne by the torrent.n--Bevan.
38.

n

Macc. 4:5; Jos. Ant. 12:5; l~· 1:11-15.

-

39. ll~· 4:9. CAR VIII, 502.
40. !m&. 4:10.
41. lbid. 4:11ff.
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hat became the chief symbols of the new order.

Even the

priests of Jehovah hastened from the Temple to the wrestling
school.42

There is nothing of coercion in this story from

antagonistic Jewish sources as yet.

All went well for three

years until Jason's brother went to Antiochus and outbid him
for the priesthood by 300 talants.

The brother, who had

hellenized his name from Oriias to Menelaus was installed in
the high-priesthood by the Syrian army and Jason was exiled
to the Ammonites. 43
The first act of violence perpetrated by Antiochus
upon the Jews was completely justified.

Jason hearing that

Antiochus was dead, attacked Antioch, {Jerusalem), and about
half of the people joined him in the rebellion.

Antiochus

busy in Egypt naturally was disturbed to hear of fighting, in
the rear of his large army, which menaced his supply lines.
Thinking "that all Judea was in revolt, he set out from Egypt
like a wild beast and took the city by storm.,,6

What unbiased

reader would blame a ruler for punishing an insurrection in
time of war?
~

.

The thing that disturbed the Jews most, however,

was the fact that Antiochus entered their Temple and profaned
the holy of holies with his presence.

He robbed the Temple,

42. Ibid. 4:23f,; Jos. Ant. 12:5; Bouse Sel. p. 170;
Swain 76.
43. II Macc. 5:5ff; Schurer, Vol. I, p. 204.
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taking all the gold he could find--about 1800 talents worth
in all.44
a.

~

Menelaus was restored as high priest.

2f force.

It was at the close of the Egyptian

War that Antiochus used force to hellenize the Jewish nation.
The reason for his use of force grew out of the change in the
I \

international set up.

Otto avers that the Jewish policy of

Antiochus was a psychological reaction to the frustration of
his Egyptian Policy.

Be then made the Jews a scapegoat for

his anger and disapPOintment.
Wie sticht sein vorgehen gegen die Juden, sein
Hellenisierungspolitik in Palestine, in der Zeit
naeh seiner Demutigung in AgYRten ab von jener,
die er vorher getrieben hat.4'
Nearer the truth, one feels, is the fact that Rome had taken
Egypt out of Antiochus' control.
border fortress on the South.

No longer was Pe1usium the

Judea was now the frontier.

If

the king's southern borders were to be secure during a
prolonged campaign in the East, there must be no question
about the loyalty of Judea.

The king had hoped for a change

in the opposition of the strict Jews.

What he thought he

saw was,
a loyal party, readily accepting the genial culture
which was to harmonize the Kingdom, on the one hand,
and on the other a people perversely and dangerously
solitary, resisting all efforts to amalgamate them

44. !l ~acc.
)
I

5:15-20;

I

Macc. 1:20-24; Jos. Ant. 12:5:3.

45. W. Otto, QR. Cit., p. 84.
(
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with the general system and only wai~ing the appear.
ance of a foreign invader to rebel. 4
The ground for resistance was religion?
)

.

Very well, either

the religion must go or the people must be replaced by Greeks.
He had no conception of what the Jewish religion was.
dared wait no longer.

He

The Jews were already partly hellen-

ized of their own accord and i t was the "advanced party"
among the Jews which urged Antiochus to take more decided
steps.47 Even after violence began Antiochus did not consider
himself the enemy of the Jews but only of the violent and
reactionary party.48
b. The terror.
Then the king wrote to his whole kingdom that they
should all become one people, and everyone should give
up his particular practices • • • And the king sent word
to. • .Judah to follow practices foreign to the
country and put a stop to whole burnt offerings and
sacrifices and drink offerings at the sanctuary, and
to break the sabbaths and profane the feasts and
pollute sanctuary and sanctified. • .and anyone who
did not obey the command of the king should die.41

I~
i

We shall probably have to look to the Hellenizing Jews,
not only for the initiation but also for the systematic carrying out, of the policy. It was one of the
commonest phenomena of ancient life. There was scarcely
a defeated factor but summoned the public enemy into
the city and by taeir aid took a cruel vengeance on
their opponents.'

46. Bouse Sel. p. 170.
47.

w.

M. Ramsay, Q],. Cit. 183; Cf. II Macc. 5:2Jf.

48. Ibid. p. 184.

I.

49. I Mace. 1:40ff.
50. Max Radin, Q:Q.. Cit., p. 144.

,
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The king acted in concert with the Hellenizing Jews, the
wealthy and powerful citizens of the city who were advising
just a little force on the "recalcitrant minority" which so
stubbornly opposed them and the day would be won.

Antiochus

naturally thought that the problem was more political than
religious.

The incorrigible Jews were to him the pro-Egyptian

group.
Der konig hat offenbar geglaubt, eine im Gang befindliche Entwicklung nicht mehr abwarten zu derfen. Er
hat jedoch sein Ziel bei den Juden nicht nur nicht
erreicht, sondern hat sogar in einem fur das Reich
besonders wichtigen Grenzgebiete, das er sichern
wollte, einen von jetzt an dauernd glimmenden gefahrlichen Brandherd geschaffen, d.h. hervorgerufem. 5l
II Maccabees relates many incidents of the steadfastness of the faithful under persecution.

One story is of one

Eleazar who was glad to undergo torture rather than eat pork. 52
In another instance a mother and her seven sons suffered the
most cruel tortures "rather than transgress the laws of our
forefathers" and were finally fried in a great pan, one at
a time. 53 Whatever the historical accuracy of these narratives,
they do at least reflect an abiding faithfulness to their
laws and a heroic willingness to suffer torture rather than
far sake a meticulous observance of them.

51.

w.

52. II

Otto,

~.

~.

6:18-31.

Cit., p. 84.

53. Ibid., 7:1-42.
\ t
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III. THE JEWISH REVOLT
1. Causes.

Rostovtzeff says, "The revolt of Judas was

directed more against the ruling classes than against the
central government."54

With this one can agree.

One can

likewise accept Rostovtzeff's reason for this revolt as a
part of the total cause of the Jewish resistance,
Judas represented the ideals and the dreams of the
large masses of the natives, a class neglected by
the government and exploited by the city bourgeoisie. 55
This cannot however be the sole reason for the Jew's resistance.

Other cities were peopled by the oppressed.

Other

Temple states resisted the removal of their sacred funds.
Nowhere else however do we see an approximation of the
stubbornness and "unreasonableness of the Jews."

There were

additional reasons.
The core of the matter was that there was bound to be
a conflict between the two systems.

Both felt that they were

peculiar and had the message for the world. 56

"Exclusiveness

was as pronounced in the one . case as it was rigid in the
other."57

"Yet this very spirit of exclusiveness was one of

the conditions which enabled each to nurture and to bring

54.

~.!.

p. 705.

55. Ibid.
56. J.M. Adams, QQ. Cit. p. 20).

-

57. Ibid.

f
).
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to maturity the life-giving germ which it bore within it. n58
As it was both have contributed to the enrichment of the world.
The Greek spirit was anti-Jewish because it was bent on
attaining the supremacy and crushing out all opposition. 59

It

was a wonderful scheme of national education--the best of its
time.

It produced excellent results in Western Asia generally

"but the Jews had more to lose than to gain by being
hellenized_ n60
religions.

Hellenism had no enemy among other Syrian

They merely called their gods by Greek names when

using the Greek language--but the Jews were monotheists.
The antagonism between the two irreconcilable civilizations invested the resistance of the Jews with a
peculiar bitterness, which was so ~conceivable to
the Kings and their Greek subjects. ol
But,
there shone out in that intense moment the sterner
and sublimer qualities which later Hellenism, ~d
above all the Hellenism of Syria, hardly knew.
There was, a difference between the gross conceptions
of the Greek and Syrian gods and goddesses and the high
monotheism of the Jews.
,

There was a difference between the

\

58. Norman Bentwich, Hellenism (Philadelphia: The
Jewish Publication Society of America, 1919), p. 27:-59. W. M. Ramsay, QR. Cit., p. 89.
60. Ibid. p. 182.

61. Pierre Jouguet,
62. House

~.

~.

p. 174.

Cit., p. 378.

,
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high ethical ideals of the Jewish sacred writings and the
practices of the Greeks who: "!illed the temple with profligacy and revelry, amusing themselves. with prostitutes and
lying with women within the sacred precincts. n63 With all its
faults, the Maccabean rising preserved the Jewish race from
being merged in Hellenism and kept it free from its destiny.64
2.

~ill~

warfare and attempts at suppression.

The only

means of resistance open to the Jewish zealots was guerilla
warfare.
the tr~)..'>

The higher classes composing the ruling cast of
were Greeks and Hellenistic Jews, many of them in

the third or fourth generation. 65

One group of zealots

escaped from Antioch (Jerusalem), to Modin, where their
leader Mattathias was bidden to offer sacrifice to the
"manifest god!"

He refused, and furthermore killed a fellow

Jew who had stepped foreward to comply.

Then he killed the

officer who was enforcing the king's edict.
ed the altar.

He also destroy-

With a parting invitation to the crowd to

63. II Mace. 6:4.
64. W. M. Ramsay,

~.

Cit. p. 182.

65. Cf. Max Radin, QQ. Qlt., p. 145; Only Hellenists
and Greeks were allowed citizenship in a Greek -rrd'A 1,$ •
Naturally all Hellenistic Jews would seek the advantages
which citizenship offered. The citizens were the ruling
caste. Others could dwell in the city but could not share
in its privileges.

,
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J

follow him, the old priest and his sons fled to the hills.
They soon organized a guerilla band which through fortunate
circumstances was to wrest practical autonomy from their
Seleucid persecutors. 66
This little group of rebels noted that a similar band
of fugitives was annihilated when it refused to fight on the
Sabbath.

Mattathias and his followers determined to fight
.
67
on the Sabbath if necessary for defence.
Thus they were

co~-

promising already in a war which was begun because the rebels
could stand for nothing but the strictest adherence to their
legal religious customs and restrictions.
In these early days Mattathias and his sons, later
called the Hasmoneans were joined by a warlike group of
Israelites called Hasidians. 68
II s f 6tait forme en Judee merne un parti de gens qui
trouvaient inco~mode et deraisonnable l'isolement
auquel les condamnait l'observance rigoureuse de la
Loi. L'etait l,~aristocratie de la nation • • • ils
souhaitaient d'etre delivres par religieuse de leurs
compatriotes. 69
They were characterized as "volunteers for the law,n 70 which
would indicate that their quarrel with Syria was religious.

66. I
67.

~££.

2:1-28.

I~.

68. From 0

2:29-41.
~

1'0
•

n meaning

".

69. Bouche-Leclercq,

,

.

saints or righteous.

• T

70. I Mac9. 2:42ff.

~.

Cit., p. 238.
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Now the combined company amounted to 6000 men who not only

...

opposed hellenization themselves but would not allow others
to accept it and further forced recalcitrant Jews into an
outward conformity to the Jewish law of circumcision.

The

Jew could not think of freedom apart from a compulsary obedience by the whole nation to their law.

Later this conform-

ity was forced on peoples of other nationality.
after the revolt began old Mattathias died.

Not long

Be had appointed

his third son Judas to be captain and Simon, his second son,
chief counselor.
Antiochus had departed for the East to furthur his
plan to restore his empire in the East.

Lysias, his viceroy

was governor in charge of all the kingdom west of the
71
Euphrates.
The problem of the Judean insurgents was of
very minor importance to Antiochus but at the same time it
was essential to have a well-ordered border province. 72
Two minor attempts were made to put down these wild hill
fighters in 166.

Appollonius with the aid of some Samaritans

set out in p·wsui t of Judas but they were ambushed and slain.
Apollonius f sword was thereafter worn by the outlaw. 7 ']
Seron, commander of the Syrian

71. Ibid. 3:32.

72. CAB, VIII, p. 514.
73.

l~.

3:10-12.

arm~with

a small detachment
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was also

in the pass at Bethhoron by Judas and fled
to the cities of Philistia. 74
ambush~d

Another ineffectual attempt to stop Judas, in ,165, is
recorded. 75

Three captains, Ptolemy, Nicanor and Gorgias,

with a force of 40,000 men ,and 7000 horses came to take the
country.

Jason of Cyrene says that Nicanor sought to enslave

the Jewish nation and thus pay the Roman indemnity of 2000
talants.

Be invited the slave traders to follow him offering
to market the captured Jews at the rate of 90 per talent. 76
While the Greek force was divided and Gorgias was seeking to
locate and destroy Judas' camp, Judas made a night attack on
the main Greek camp at Emmaus of the plain and took it.

The

rebel restrained his well-disciplined men from looting until
Gorgias returned and then bested the general, thus nipping
the Greek campaign in the bud.

The slave dealers had under-

gone the ardors of their journey·in vain.
3.

~jg1!~

effgrts a t

r§.B.~sipn.

Up to this point the

Jewish affair had not been greatly disturbing to the leaders

74.

Ibig.

75.

~.

3:38-4:25.

76. II Macc. 8:10. Of course the indemnity haq been paid
long since-but it had been so prominent that it was natural
for the Jews to understand it as the object of any great
attempt to raise funds. The numbers of the Syrian force are
doubtless an ex~ration. One wonders how the Jews obtained
such accurate information as to the exact numbers of their
opponents.
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at Antioch.

Antioch (Jerusalem), was completely pacified and

UDIQughly hellenized.

Judas had been considered a problem

for the local administrators.

They were assigned the task of

mopping-up the Judean bands of recalcitrants who roamed the
wilderness.

The Singular lack of succeSf, on the part of the

underlings however finally aroused Lysia, the governor, to a
personal effort.

60,000 picked men were sent south of Jeru-

salem to Bethsura in Idumea.
of 10,000.

By this time Judas had an army

No doubt this "expedition was from the viewpoint

of the Greeks a reconoitering movement to feel out the
strength of the rebels and ascertain just what the situation
required.

Again Judas is alleged to have routed the Greeks.

"In view of the ease with which even distinct defeats are
seen to be transfigured in the imagination of the Jewish
writers into Victories, it may be questioned whether much
damage was inflicted upon the regent's army.n77

Lysias was

forced however to take a serious view of the matter.

He

retired to Antioch to recruit more mercenaries and continue
the struggle on a more active scale. 78
4.

Rededica~iop

Qf !h! lem21e.

Following this Victory Judas

and his brothers determined to rededicate the Temple in

77.

Hou~ §~.,

--

p. 180.

78. I Macc. 4:26ff.

!
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Jerusalem to Jehovah, their God.

In all these struggles

Jerusalem had been securely in the hands of the Greeks with a
strong garrison in the citadel.

Bevan surmises that Lysias

allowed the Hasmoneans to enter Jerusalem and rededicate the
Temple. 79

Jewish sources however insist that Judas and his

party were now strong enough to hold off the garrison in
the citadel and take possession of the city in their own
80
strength.
The Temple was ceremonially cleansed and rededicated with great rejoicing on the same day of the year
(December 25) on which it had been poluted three years before.
The event was so important to them that they ordered that the
same period should be observed each year as the Feast of
Dedication or the Feast of LightS. 8l
Thus these zealots had secured the first of their
objectives--religious toleration for themselves and the pos~e3~on

of their Temple for the worship of Jehovah, their God.

They fortified Mount Zion against the Syrian garrison and
Bethzura against the Idumeans and looked foreward to the
future with faith and courage. 82

79. QAR, VIII, 515.
80.

l~.

81.

II~.

4:36ff.
10:1-8.

82. 1 Macc. 4:60, 1.
, ,I
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4. Period Qf Toleration. One is inclined to side with Bevan
and accept the death of Antiochus Epiphanes as the occasion
for leniency on the part of Lysias, the Governor, who then
allowed the Jews to rededicate their temple.

Ptolemy Macron,

the governor of Coele-Syria, was friendly toward the Jews
and counseled a policy of moderation and amicability.83

When

Judas went so far as to attack the citadel in Antioch (Jerusaem),
however Lysias, who seems to have had control over the young
Antiochus V as regent, was forced to take vigorous action.
Be organized a real punitive expedition against Judas in 162.
Lysias and the boy king marched against Bethzura and then
against~eareby

Bethzechariah.

The fanatic zeal of Judas'

men, illustrated by the heroic death of Judas' own brother
Eleazar, was not enough to stem the tide of a real Greek army
of superior forces.
Jerusalem.

The Jews were defeated and fell back on

Resistance was difficult for the Jews because it

was a Sabattical year.

Destruction seemed certain for them

until Lysias was diverted from the siege by the return of
Philip, the regent appointed by Antiochus Epiphanes.
J .

Philip

was nearing Antioh, the capital, at the head of the victorious
Eastern Army_

83.

II

With this threat at his back Lysias came to

Macc. 10:12.

~J

I
~-

j
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,

terms with the Jews confirming tAeir religious toleration.
The Greeks then evacuated the city after destroying the
fortress of the Jews on Mount Zion. 84
Thereafter the dynastic difficulties of the Seleucids
were the inhibiting factor in their rule of JUdea.

The

pacification came too late for Epiphanes, however. The Seleucid power was on the wane and the Jews enjoyed practical
autonomy (at its expense) except when a strong ruler like
Demetrius I or Antiochus .VII Sidetes reigned.

84. 1 Macc •. 6:19ff.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
I. PERSONALITY OF ANTIOCHUS EPIPHANES
Antiochus Epiphanes has been misrepresented in history
because he has been misunderstood. l He is revealed by
research as a strong, vigorous character who should have a
high place among rulers because of his abilities.

His

analysis of his kingdom's problems and his vigorous efforts
to ameliorate these conditions and succeed against tremendous obstacles is laudable. 2

Impartial judgement would deem

his persecution of the Jews as an error, but an error largely
due to ignorance of the true situation on his part. 3 He knew
nothing of the Jewish problem first hand and was the victim
of his advisors.

II. HISTORICAL
1. Importance of

~h~

East.

The eastern campaigns of Antio-

chus III and Antiochus Epiphanes demonstrate that the country
I

t-

east of

M~opotamia

deserves a much higher rank in our

consideration of Hellenism and its history.4
1. Cf. pp. 4; 38;9.
2.

~d.

3. Cf. pp. 89,90.

4. Cf.

p. 67. n, 86 esp.

The Middle East

1
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and the Farther East have been completely lost sight of in
all too many cases whereas the Seleucids saw there what promised to be a most important element of their empire.
2. Egypti!Q Campaigns.

There is no justification in the

sources for more than two Egyptian campaigns.5 Polybius is
too trustworthy to be sidetracked

for the sake of one word,

in as unreliable a work as that by Jason of Cyrene or because
of a vague vision of Daniel.

Livy is befuddled on the issue

but has many of the facts in confused farm which would lead
to a two campaign view.
3. Antiochus and the

~~.

Antiochus' policy toward the

Jews on the whole must be reckoned as one of friendship.6
The dominant party of the Jews were hellenized and that of
their own Seeking. 7 Antiochus Epiphanes saw his opponents
as a recalcitrant minority and he permitted the majority in
the autonomous state of Antioch (Jerusalem), to use his name
and power in dealing with the few who hindered the complete
hellenization of the people. 8 His relations with the
dispersion Jews was cordial. 9
,

.

4.

Maccabean~.

From a military point of view the

5. p. 59, n. 5la.
6. p. 9lf.
7. p. 88ff.

8. Ibid.
9. p. 91, n. a.
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Maccabean wars (if they may be dignified by that name),
.

were of little practical value.

10

The disruption of the

Macedonian kingdoms was in progress.

In particular were the

bonds restraining the subject pejples of the Seleucid Empire
djss'olving.

This resulted in freedom for Parthia, Bactria

and other groups which had been subject to the Empire as well
as for the Jews.

When the Seleucid power was weakened by

dynastic strife or outside interference the Jews were able to
assert some little independence--this was never complete.

On

the other hand whenever a strong Seleucid ruler such as
Demetrius I or Antiochus VII Sidetes came to the throne, the
Jewish pseudo-independence vanished.ll
III. RELIGIOUS
Although the Kaccabean wars were of little consequence
politically, the religious results of the struggle were quite
significant.

They have affected the history of the Jews down

to the present time.
1. Preservation

2£ monotheism. The outstanding result of

this struggle was the preservation of a pure ethical monotheism
in the face of a threat to its very existence.

Whereas the

people of Judea, led by the priesthood, has been unconcerned

10. p. 101.

11. Ibid.

,•
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heretofore, the struggle which Judas led, infused the Nation
with a determination to resist any effort to destroy their
religion or to alter their monotheistic conception of· God.
This conception has enriched the world.

It paved the way

for the Christian religion and the Mohammedan as well.
2. lewish

exclusivenes~.

The struggle demonstrated first

of all the basie mutual incompatibility of the two religious
and philisophical systems; Judaism and Hellenism. 12 They
were mutually exclusive until the power of Christianity
merged the two philosophies.1 3
3. Dispersion Jewp.

Of far reaching importance was the

revival in the religious and racial loyalties of the diaspora,
or the group of Jews dispersed over the world.

They had

heretofore been slowly but nonetheless surely drifting away
from the customs of their fathers.

From this point foreward

they develope into the heirs of Judaism both in its Christian
development
the

an~

destruc~ion

in the Jewish remnant which was left after

of the Temple and the scattering of the

nation by Titus in 70 A.D.

4. Palestinian Judaism. From this period foreward the Jewish religion became

~ssified

and reactionary in its exclu-

12. pp. 92,3.

13. W.M. Ramsay, The Cities of St. Paul (New York:
A.C. Armstrong and Son;-I909J, IntrOd~
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sion of all non-Jewish elements.

The party of the Pharasees

developed in this period and the Zealots drew their inspiration falsely, but nonetheless certainly, from the exploits of
Judas, the Maccabee and his brethren.

5. APocalyptic.

The Apocalyptic literature flowered under

the pressure of hellenistic force.

The first Martyrologies

were developed in this period and passed over into Christian
literature as a type.
The search for a military and political messiah which
so dominated the world in Jesus f day sprang up from these
roots.

It gave form to Messianism.

In this period Apocalyptic writings were extant. l4

Daniel in the canon and others of the Apocrypha which molded
the form as a type, found their chief impetus in the Maccabean
struggle.

This whole development laid the background for the

Kingdom of God movement initiated by John the Baptist and
carried foreward by Jesus.

: I

14. Zechariah, Ezekiel, Isaiah.
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